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ABSTRACT	  	   	  	   Scholarship on Japan’s Occupation Period (1945-1952) has focused on the ways 
in which Japan was transformed from an imperial power to a democratic nation. While 
such work provides valuable information about how the Supreme Commanders for the 
Allied Powers (SCAP) affected Japan’s political climate following the end of the Asia-
Pacific War, they gloss over other ways in which the SCAP government came in contact 
with the Japanese people. The topic of health is one that has seldom been explored within 
the context of the Allied Occupation of Japan, despite the fact that the task of restoring 
and maintaining health brought SCAP personnel and policies into daily contact with both 
the Japanese government and people. By focusing on the disease tuberculosis, which 
boasted the highest mortality rate not only during the Occupation Period, but also for 
most of the first-half of the twentieth century, this paper hopes to illuminate the ways in 
which health brought the Allied Powers and Japanese into constant contact. 
 The managing of tuberculosis in the Occupation Period represented a major 
success for SCAP’s Public Health and Welfare (PH&W) section. The new medical 
findings, medicines, and management and education systems that the PH&W 
incorporated into the Japanese health systems played a large role in the PH&W’s success 
in controlling tuberculosis within Japan. The PH&W’s expertise in dealing with 
tuberculosis reconnected Japan with the international medical community it had forfeited 
during the Asia-Pacific War. In doing so the PH&W also helped dispel the social stigma 
that surrounded tuberculosis and hindered earlier attempts to halt the disease’s spread.  
 The management of tuberculosis was a major success for the Japanese 
government as well. While the PH&W section was quick to point out that their 
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introduction of modern science into Japan lead to the defeat of tuberculosis, many of the 
methods used to combat the disease were familiar to the Japanese government and 
medical community. While SCAP may have provided new drugs like streptomycin, 
Japanese medical professionals were already well versed in the production and 
distribution of vaccines. Japanese citizens had also previously been exposed to many of 
the practices, such as regular tuberculosis screenings that the PH&W section mandated. 
The Japanese governments ample supply of manpower was also a crucial, though often 
overlooked, component of tuberculosis control in the Occupation period. 
 Tuberculosis control was achieved during the Occupation Period through the 
cooperation of both SCAP and the Japanese government and medical community. After 
explaining why tuberculosis remained a problem in the early twentieth century, despite 
Japanese medical communities efforts to dispel the social stigma surrounding 
tuberculosis and to manage the disease, this paper examines why tuberculosis rates grew 
at their fastest pace ever following the end of the Asia-Pacific War. The early years of the 
Occupation brought both immediate changes instituted by the PH&W section and 
practices that had prewar precedents within Japan. Finally, this paper turns to the 
PH&W’s push to control tuberculosis. Building on the changes instituted in the early 
Occupation Period, the PH&W section introduced new findings concerning tuberculosis 
and strictly reinstated familiar practices including mandatory vaccine drives, in order to 
finally overcome tuberculosis.  	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CHAPTER	  1	  
INTRODUCTION	  	   	  Miyazaki	  Hayao’s	  final	  film,	  The	  Wind	  Also	  Rises,	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  Horikoshi	  Jiro,	  the	  designer	  of	  the	  Mitsubishi	  A6M	  Zero.	  While	  the	  film	  focuses	  on	  Jiro’s	  successes	  and	  failures	  as	  an	  aircraft	  engineer,	  it	  also	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  Jiro’s	  love,	  Naoko.	  She	  suffers	  from	  tuberculosis	  and	  spends	  much	  of	  the	  film	  separated	  from	  Jiro.	  Although	  he	  returns	  to	  her	  frequently,	  their	  time	  together	  is	  short.	  She	  passes	  away	  at	  near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  film,	  leaving	  Jiro	  to	  reconcile	  his	  dream	  of	  creating	  beautiful	  aircraft	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  destructive	  use	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  War.	  	  	   Naoko’s	  struggle	  with	  tuberculosis	  represents	  a	  small,	  yet	  important,	  depiction	  of	  life	  in	  Japan	  before	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  War.	  Her	  death	  represents	  just	  one	  of	  the	  millions	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  war.	  Moreover,	  her	  death	  is	  one	  that	  seems	  only	  tenuously	  related	  to	  the	  war.	  Her	  struggle	  with	  tuberculosis	  was,	  however,	  a	  struggle	  that	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Japanese	  faced	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis	  throughout	  Japan	  in	  fact	  had	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Empire	  as	  it	  did	  with	  the	  disease’s	  own	  ability	  to	  infect	  populations	  quickly	  and	  efficiently.	  Yet,	  the	  story	  of	  tuberculosis’s	  rise	  has	  been	  almost	  entirely	  lost	  within	  accounts	  of	  the	  Japan’s	  imperial	  decades.	  	   Today	  it	  is	  perhaps	  easy	  to	  overlook	  the	  significance	  that	  diseases	  like	  tuberculosis	  held	  only	  half	  century	  ago.	  While	  tuberculosis	  claimed	  more	  Japanese	  lives	  from	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  through	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Occupation	  period	  than	  any	  other	  disease,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  disease	  that	  is	  readily	  associated	  with	  modern	  Japan.	  Rather,	  tuberculosis	  is	  a	  disease	  that	  fraternizes	  with	  developing	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countries.	  It	  is	  a	  disease	  that	  seeks	  out	  countries	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  industrialization,	  and	  makes	  itself	  a	  home	  within	  their	  populations.	  As	  Japan’s	  political	  and	  business	  leaders	  drew	  on	  the	  collective	  labor	  of	  their	  workers	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  growth	  and	  wealth,	  tuberculosis	  drew	  upon	  the	  labor	  of	  those	  same	  workers	  to	  breed	  itself.	  	  	   Japan	  began	  the	  process	  of	  industrializing	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Japan	  also	  engaged	  in	  empire	  building.	  Japan’s	  quest	  for	  growth	  transported	  bodies	  from	  the	  countryside	  to	  the	  city,	  and	  from	  the	  homeland	  to	  new	  territories.	  It	  also	  taxed	  these	  bodies	  heavily	  with	  the	  work	  needed	  for	  production	  and	  protection.	  A	  rise	  in	  diseases,	  tuberculosis	  key	  amongst	  them,	  occurred	  concurrent	  to	  both	  of	  these	  transformations.	  In	  1945,	  when	  Japan’s	  empire	  and	  industries	  crumbled	  in	  defeat,	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  remained	  as	  strong	  as	  ever.	  	  	   	  Historians	  interested	  in	  Japan	  often	  use	  1945	  to	  talk	  about	  endings	  and	  beginnings.	  They	  talk	  about	  the	  end	  of	  Japan’s	  aggressive	  push	  for	  control	  in	  East	  Asia,	  the	  end	  of	  its	  empire,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  Japan’s	  ability	  to	  wage	  war	  abroad	  and	  at	  home.	  They	  talk	  about	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Allied	  Occupation,	  the	  beginning	  of	  Japan’s	  reconstruction,	  and,	  perhaps	  most	  often,	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  United	  State’s	  highly	  influential	  political	  relationship	  with	  Japan.	  Continuities,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  are	  forgotten	  in	  this	  discussion	  of	  beginnings	  and	  endings.	  Contagious	  diseases	  like	  typhus,	  dysentery,	  and	  tuberculosis	  were	  unaffected	  by	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Potsdam	  Declaration.	  These	  diseases	  thrived	  just	  as	  well	  in	  Japan’s	  deteriorating	  wartime	  cities	  as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  ruins	  of	  its	  postwar	  urban	  centers.	  A	  through	  examination	  of	  diseases	  like	  tuberculosis,	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  see	  how	  1945	  was	  both	  a	  time	  of	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dramatic	  beginnings	  and	  endings,	  and	  a	  time	  in	  which	  pre-­‐war	  conditions	  continued	  to	  affect	  postwar	  circumstances	  in	  dramatic	  ways.	  	  	  	   Most	  historians	  writing	  about	  the	  Occupation	  of	  Japan	  overlook	  the	  significance	  of	  disease	  as	  a	  hindrance	  to	  both	  Japan’s	  war-­‐making	  capacity	  and	  reconstruction	  efforts.	  John	  Dower,	  whose	  book	  Embracing	  Defeat	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  cornerstones	  of	  scholarship	  on	  the	  occupation	  period,	  for	  the	  most	  part	  eschews	  the	  discussion	  of	  social	  conditions	  like	  disease	  in	  favor	  of	  outlining	  the	  new	  and	  vibrant	  political	  climate	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  occupation	  period.1	  While	  he	  devotes	  several	  chapters	  to	  living	  conditions	  in	  occupied	  Japan,	  descriptions	  of	  disease	  are	  lost	  in	  a	  tumult	  of	  social	  issues	  that	  includes	  housing	  and	  food	  shortages,	  crippling	  inflation,	  and	  the	  psychological	  exhaustion	  that	  accompanied	  Japan’s	  surrender.	  	  	  	   Although	  the	  majority	  historians	  working	  on	  issues	  in	  twentieth	  century	  Japan	  have	  only	  discussed	  issues	  of	  health	  and	  disease	  in	  a	  cursory	  nature,	  two	  recent	  monographs	  have	  directly	  addressed	  these	  subjects.	  The	  first	  of	  the	  two,	  William	  Johnston’s	  The	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  follows	  the	  development	  of	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries.	  He	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  hole	  in	  modern	  Japanese	  history	  where	  the	  topics	  of	  disease	  and	  public	  health	  are	  concerned.	  Through	  writing	  a	  history	  of	  tuberculosis,	  Johnston	  calls	  attention	  to	  a	  previously	  overlooked	  story,	  and	  also	  illuminates	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Japanese	  public	  experienced	  disease,	  scientific	  change,	  and	  the	  hand	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  John	  Dower,	  Embracing	  Defeat:	  Japan	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  World	  War	  II	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  1999).	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the	  government	  in	  their	  daily	  lives.2While	  Johnston’s	  work	  vividly	  depicts	  the	  battle	  between	  tuberculosis	  and	  Japanese	  health	  authorities,	  his	  narrative	  all	  but	  ends	  with	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  occupation	  period	  -­‐	  the	  time	  in	  which	  tuberculosis	  cases	  both	  reached	  their	  all-­‐time	  high	  and	  also	  were	  first	  brought	  under	  control.	  Johnston	  has	  little	  to	  say	  about	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  for	  the	  Allied	  Powers	  (SCAP)	  and	  their	  partners	  in	  the	  Japanese	  government’s	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (MHW).3	  In	  choosing	  to	  focus	  most	  heavily	  on	  the	  history	  of	  tuberculosis	  in	  Japan	  during	  the	  years	  1890-­‐1945,	  Johnston	  has	  provided	  many	  important	  and	  fascinating	  glimpses	  into	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  Japanese	  citizens	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  but	  he	  has	  also	  left	  many	  questions	  about	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  Occupation	  Period	  unanswered.	  	  	   Reforming	  Public	  Health	  in	  Occupied	  Japan,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  examines	  the	  attempts	  made	  to	  control	  disease	  and	  changes	  brought	  to	  the	  Japanese	  health	  system	  during	  the	  Occupation	  Period.	  The	  co-­‐authors,	  historians	  Christopher	  Aldous	  and	  Akihito	  Suzuki,	  analyze	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  work	  done	  by	  SCAP’s	  Public	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  Division	  (PH&W)	  and	  the	  department’s	  leader,	  General	  Crawford	  F.	  Sams,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  rehabilitating	  Japan’s	  medical	  community.	  Their	  book	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  only	  studies	  in	  the	  English-­‐language	  scholarship	  to	  devote	  itself	  wholly	  to	  examining	  the	  issue	  of	  public	  health	  in	  postwar	  Japan.	  Aldous	  and	  Suzuki	  point	  out	  that	  generally	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  PH&W	  division	  was	  successful	  if	  and	  when	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  William	  Johnston,	  The	  Modern	  Epidemic:	  A	  History	  of	  Tuberculosis	  in	  Japan	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Asia	  Center,	  1995),	  4	  and	  6.	  	  3	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Kōsei-­‐shō	  in	  Japanese,	  but	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  it	  using	  the	  acronym	  MHW	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  Kōsei-­‐shō	  no	  longer	  exists	  under	  this	  name.	  Instead	  it	  merged	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  (Rōdō-­‐shō)	  to	  become	  today’s	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  Labour,	  and	  Welfare	  (Kōsei-­‐rōdō-­‐shō.)	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mirrored	  pre-­‐war	  policies	  that	  were	  already	  familiar	  to	  the	  Japanese.	  Furthermore,	  they	  believe	  Sams	  remained	  blind	  to	  this	  fact,	  and	  that	  he	  considered	  Japan	  to	  be	  an	  unhygienic	  country	  with	  little	  understanding	  of	  how	  disease	  spread	  or	  the	  workings	  of	  sanitation	  engineering.	  To	  Aldous	  and	  Suzuki,	  Sams	  did	  not,	  as	  the	  general	  himself	  believed,	  bring	  modern	  medical	  science	  to	  Japan.	  Rather,	  the	  orders	  given	  by	  his	  PH&W	  department,	  and	  largely	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Japanese	  MHW,	  allowed	  for	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  health	  and	  sanitation	  practices	  known	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  but	  were	  disrupted	  by	  the	  war.4	  	  Aldous	  and	  Suzuki’s	  argue	  that	  policies	  that	  were	  continuous	  with	  those	  of	  the	  prewar	  and	  wartime	  periods	  were	  the	  ones	  that	  produced	  results	  in	  occupied	  Japan.	  Their	  argument,	  however,	  does	  not	  entirely	  explain	  how	  both	  the	  PH&W	  division	  of	  SCAP	  and	  its	  Japanese	  counterpart,	  the	  MHW,	  dealt	  with	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic.5	  As	  Johnston’s	  work	  discusses	  in	  depth,	  for	  the	  Japanese	  the	  contraction	  of	  tuberculosis	  was	  accompanied	  with	  a	  severe	  social	  stigma.	  A	  simple	  return	  to	  prewar	  practices	  aimed	  at	  controlling	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis	  would	  have	  been	  insufficient	  in	  dispelling	  the	  social	  stigma	  that	  the	  disease	  carried,	  and	  therein	  could	  not	  truly	  eradicate	  the	  disease.	  While	  there	  is	  merit	  in	  Aldous	  and	  Suzuki’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  PH&W	  division	  and	  Sams’s	  actions	  during	  the	  occupation	  period,	  especially	  where	  practices	  of	  sanitation	  are	  concerned,	  the	  task	  of	  controlling	  tuberculosis	  was	  one	  that	  also	  benefited	  from	  the	  influx	  of	  new	  medical	  knowledge,	  health	  practices,	  and	  data	  organization	  techniques	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  Christopher	  Aldous	  and	  Akihito	  Suzuki,	  Reforming	  Public	  Health	  in	  Occupied	  Japan	  (Abingdon,	  Routledge,	  2012),	  3.	  5	  Aldous	  and	  Suzuki,	  Reforming	  Public	  Health,	  6.	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For	  this	  very	  reason,	  tuberculosis	  is	  as	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  story	  of	  postwar	  reconstruction	  as	  it	  is	  a	  story	  of	  disease.	  Unlike	  other	  diseases,	  such	  as	  dysentery,	  cholera,	  and	  typhus,	  that	  plagued	  the	  Japanese	  people	  during	  the	  occupation	  period,	  the	  task	  of	  controlling	  tuberculosis	  required	  the	  cooperation	  of	  both	  occupier	  and	  occupied	  to	  be	  accomplished.	  A	  careful	  mixture	  of	  both	  change	  and	  continuity	  provided	  the	  Japanese	  and	  SCAP	  with	  the	  highest	  chance	  for	  success	  in	  combatting	  diseases	  that	  had	  been	  endemic	  within	  Japan	  before	  the	  war	  and	  ran	  rampant	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  This	  mixture	  of	  familiar	  practices	  and	  cutting	  edge	  knowledge	  was	  especially	  crucial	  in	  the	  case	  of	  tuberculosis	  control	  not	  only	  because	  tuberculosis	  had	  been,	  for	  more	  than	  half	  a	  century,	  the	  disease	  that	  took	  the	  most	  Japanese	  lives,	  but	  also	  a	  disease	  to	  which	  the	  Japanese	  people	  assigned	  a	  severe	  stigma.	  	  This	  paper	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  pick	  up	  where	  Johnston’s	  The	  Modern	  Epidemic	  leaves	  off,	  and	  to	  investigate	  the	  joint	  effort	  undertaken	  by	  Japanese	  government	  and	  SCAP	  in	  order	  to	  control	  and	  halt	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis.	  Tuberculosis’s	  history	  appears	  throughout	  both	  the	  documents	  of	  the	  SCAP	  PH&W	  division	  and	  the	  Japanese	  MHW.	  Tuberculosis	  and	  the	  various	  social	  factors	  that	  made	  the	  disease’s	  continued	  postwar	  growth	  possible	  also	  appear	  in	  the	  memoirs	  of	  Japanese	  and	  American	  doctors,	  social	  workers,	  and	  citizens.	  	  Drawing	  on	  both	  the	  Japanese	  government	  and	  SCAP’s	  commentaries	  on	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  occupation	  period	  provides	  the	  best	  means	  of	  understanding	  how	  both	  institutions	  came	  to	  work	  together	  with	  the	  shared	  goal	  of	  controlling	  tuberculosis.	  While	  Sams	  and	  the	  PH&W	  were	  not	  as	  single-­‐handedly	  successful	  at	  combatting	  disease	  and	  restoring	  public	  health	  in	  Japan	  as	  their	  records	  suggest,	  the	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story	  of	  tuberculosis	  control	  in	  occupied	  Japan	  is	  one	  which	  highlights	  some	  of	  their	  greatest	  successes.	  The	  PH&W’s	  restructured	  Japan’s	  hospital	  and	  medical	  education	  systems,	  introduced	  new	  medical	  technologies,	  and	  the	  aided	  in	  changing	  the	  social	  views	  surrounding	  tuberculosis.	  The	  PH&W’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  disease	  inspired	  ensured	  that	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  rates	  declined	  much	  faster	  than	  they	  would	  have	  had	  the	  Japanese	  government	  been	  left	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  epidemic	  single-­‐handedly.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  despite	  what	  Sams	  and	  others	  in	  the	  PH&W	  department	  claimed,	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Occupation	  Period	  Japan	  was	  not	  without	  its	  own	  means	  for	  combatting	  tuberculosis.	  Many	  practices,	  such	  as	  vaccination	  drives	  and	  mandatory	  disease	  reporting	  were	  practiced	  in	  the	  interwar	  and	  war	  years.	  	  Without	  drawing	  upon	  both	  these	  familiar	  practices	  and	  the	  often	  discounted,	  yet	  crucial	  manpower	  mobilized	  by	  the	  MHW,	  the	  PH&W’s	  campaigns	  against	  tuberculosis	  would	  have	  been	  fruitless.	  Only	  with	  the	  coupling	  of	  these,	  to	  borrow	  a	  phrase	  from	  Dower,	  previously	  “embraced”	  techniques	  and	  new	  medical	  findings	  could	  the	  PH&W	  division	  and	  their	  partners	  in	  Japan’s	  MHW	  bring	  tuberculosis	  under	  control.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
TUBERCULOSIS	  IN	  THE	  PRE-­‐OCCUPATION	  PERIOD:	  1890-­‐1945	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  why	  controlling	  tuberculosis	  posed	  such	  a	  challenge	  during	  the	  occupation	  period,	  and	  why	  such	  a	  challenge	  could	  not	  be	  met	  by	  the	  Japanese	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (MHW)	  alone,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  Japan’s	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  before	  the	  occupation	  as	  well.	  Japan’s	  struggles	  with	  tuberculosis	  control	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  centuries	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  its	  postwar	  problems	  as	  well.	  It	  is	  due	  to	  broad	  factors	  that	  affected	  the	  whole	  of	  society	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  War	  and,	  eventually,	  the	  occupation,	  that	  tuberculosis	  became	  an	  epidemic.	  	  These	  factors	  included	  both	  Japan’s	  rise	  to	  an	  industrial	  nation	  and	  its	  empire	  building	  projects.	  It	  is	  also	  during	  these	  years	  that	  health	  professionals	  in	  Japan	  initiated	  their	  first	  policies	  to	  curb	  tuberculosis.	  Through	  understanding	  why	  these	  early	  attempts	  to	  control	  tuberculosis	  ultimately	  failed,	  it	  is	  possible	  also	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  joint	  efforts	  of	  both	  the	  Japanese	  MHW	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  for	  the	  Allied	  Powers’s	  (SCAP)	  Public	  health	  and	  Welfare	  (PH&W)	  were	  necessary	  for	  the	  success	  that	  came	  in	  the	  Occupation	  Period.	  	  Most	  forms	  of	  tuberculosis,	  a	  bacterial	  disease	  caused	  by	  the	  tubercle	  bacillus,	  infect	  the	  lungs	  of	  those	  who	  have	  caught	  the	  disease.6	  Tuberculosis	  causes	  its	  sufferers	  to	  exhibit	  many	  symptoms	  including	  weight	  loss,	  fatigue	  and	  fever.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  According	  to	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control,	  tuberculosis	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  bacterium	  formally	  called	  
Mycobacterium	  Tuberculosis.	  The	  phrase	  tubercule	  bacillus	  refers	  not	  to	  the	  formal	  disease	  nomenclature	  for	  tuberculosis,	  but	  instead	  to	  the	  actual	  tuberculosis	  bacterium	  itself.	  Bacillus	  refers	  specifically	  to	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  bacteria.	  Tuberculosis	  bacteria	  are	  rod-­‐shaped,	  and	  thus	  are	  classified	  as	  bacilli.	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  use	  the	  term	  tubercule	  bacillus	  over	  to	  Mycobacterium	  Tuberculosis	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  tuberculosis	  bacteria	  itself	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  continuity	  with	  other	  authors’,	  including	  Johnston,	  terms.	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Tuberculosis	  is	  most	  identifiable,	  however,	  as	  a	  disease	  that	  causes	  chronic	  coughing,	  which	  is	  at	  times	  accompanied	  by	  the	  expulsion	  of	  blood.	  Tuberculosis’s	  mode	  of	  transmission	  makes	  it	  a	  particularly	  dangerous	  disease,	  especially	  in	  densely	  populated	  areas.	  Tuberculosis	  is	  classified	  as	  an	  airborne	  disease,	  which	  means	  that	  not	  only	  does	  it	  spread	  through	  the	  air,	  but	  also	  that	  tuberculosis	  droplets	  linger	  within	  the	  air	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time.7	  Tuberculosis’s	  ability	  to	  survive	  within	  air	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time,	  coupled	  with	  the	  tuberculosis	  sufferer’s	  propensity	  to	  cough	  strenuously,	  allows	  tuberculosis	  to	  spread	  from	  person	  to	  person	  with	  alarming	  efficiency.	  The	  history	  of	  tuberculosis,	  which	  is	  know	  as	  kekkaku	  (結核)	  in	  Japan	  is	  one	  that	  stretches	  back	  thousands	  of	  years.	  Archaeological	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  tuberculosis	  first	  appeared	  in	  Japan	  during	  the	  third	  century	  B.C.E..	  Tubercular	  lesions	  on	  bones	  found	  in	  excavated	  graves	  from	  the	  sixth	  century	  C.E.	  onward	  have	  shown	  that	  by	  this	  time	  tuberculosis	  was	  a	  fairly	  common	  disease.8	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  1870s,	  however,	  that	  tuberculosis	  outbreaks	  occurred	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  In	  this	  initial	  epidemic,	  which	  heralded	  the	  later	  Japan-­‐wide	  tuberculosis	  epidemic,	  mortality	  rates	  for	  Ainu	  sufferers	  reached	  9250	  per	  100,000,	  the	  highest	  ever	  recorded	  amongst	  a	  population.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “Basic	  TB	  Facts,”	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention,	  http://www.cdc.gov/tb/	  publications/	  faqs/qa_introduction.htm#Intro3.	  8	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  40.	  	  9	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  68.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1909,	  nearly	  thirty	  years	  after	  tuberculosis	  had	  first	  broken	  out	  amongst	  the	  Ainu	  people,	  555	  Ainu	  died	  of	  tuberculosis.	  That	  same	  year	  only	  179	  Japanese	  died	  of	  the	  disease.	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  While	  the	  earliest	  serious	  outbreaks	  occurred	  amongst	  the	  Ainu	  peoples	  in	  Hokkaido	  in	  the	  1870s,	  the	  disease	  soon	  spread	  southward.10	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1880s,	  tuberculosis	  had	  become	  so	  prevalent	  that	  the	  Meiji	  government	  could	  no	  longer	  ignore	  the	  disease	  as	  they	  had	  done	  when	  it	  broke	  out	  within	  Ainu	  communities.	  In	  1886,	  the	  government	  took	  its	  first	  official	  steps	  towards	  tuberculosis	  control.	  The	  Meiji	  Government	  mandated	  reporting	  of	  tuberculosis	  by	  physicians,	  and	  also	  published	  morbidity	  statistics	  for	  the	  disease.	  11	  These	  same	  measures,	  which	  constituted	  the	  only	  action	  the	  government	  took	  against	  tuberculosis	  until	  the	  1930s,	  would	  be	  only	  haphazardly	  enforced	  throughout	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Surprisingly,	  the	  international	  medical	  community	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  tubercle	  bacillus,	  for	  more	  than	  twenty	  years	  before	  the	  Meiji	  government	  addressed	  tuberculosis	  control.12	  	  However	  the	  turmoil	  brought	  by	  the	  final	  years	  of	  the	  Tokugawa	  Shogunate	  (1600-­‐1868)	  ensured	  that	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  world	  outside	  Japan	  took	  a	  back	  seat	  to	  internal	  concerns.	  During	  the	  1850s	  and	  1860s,	  turmoil	  created	  by	  the	  conflict	  between	  those	  loyal	  to	  the	  shogun	  and	  those	  who	  wished	  to	  reinstate	  the	  emperor	  was,	  however,	  conducive	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis.	  Events	  like	  the	  Tenpo	  Famine,	  which	  lasted	  from	  1833-­‐1837,	  lead	  to	  increased	  public	  uprisings,	  and	  were	  compounded	  by	  threats	  from	  abroad.	  As	  the	  Tokugawa	  Shogunate	  increasingly	  lost	  influence	  over	  the	  Japanese	  populace,	  people	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  67	  11	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  163.	  12	  The	  scientific	  community	  was,	  in	  the	  1860s,	  aware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  bacterium	  that	  caused	  tuberculosis	  and	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  new	  bacterium	  caused	  the	  symptoms	  we	  understand	  to	  be	  indicative	  of	  tuberculosis	  today.	  They	  were	  not	  aware	  that	  this	  bacterium	  was	  the	  singular	  cause	  of	  tuberculosis,	  and	  as	  such	  this	  newly	  discovered	  bacterium	  was	  not	  assigned	  the	  name	  tubercule	  
bacillus	  initially.	  The	  disease	  caused	  by	  this	  bacterium,	  Mycobacterium	  tuberculosis,	  would	  not	  be	  formally	  discovered	  and	  defined	  until	  after	  the	  Meiji	  Restoration.	  Johnston,	  163.	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found	  themselves	  with	  an	  increased	  freedom	  of	  movement.	  The	  breakdown	  of	  Tokugawa	  control	  meant	  that	  villagers	  were	  no	  longer	  confined	  to	  their	  villages.	  This	  increased	  freedom	  of	  movement	  accelerated	  the	  trend	  of	  urbanization	  that	  began	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century.	  The	  movement	  of	  people	  from	  their	  ancestral	  villages	  to	  Japan’s	  large	  cities	  in	  turn	  expedited	  the	  growth	  of	  squalid,	  slum-­‐like	  neighborhoods.13	  Within	  these	  newly	  formed	  communities,	  tuberculosis	  spread	  quickly	  from	  body	  to	  body	  and	  household	  to	  household.	  	   Why,	  then,	  did	  the	  Meiji	  Government	  wait	  nearly	  forty	  years	  to	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  tuberculosis	  within	  Japan?	  Johnston	  argues	  that	  the	  Meiji	  government	  became	  interested	  in	  tuberculosis	  in	  1886	  only	  because	  at	  this	  time	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  finally	  became	  dire	  enough	  to	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  government	  itself.	  In	  a	  time	  when	  the	  government’s	  resources	  were	  used	  not	  only	  to	  quell	  civil	  unrest	  	  but	  also	  to	  manage	  other	  outbreaks	  such	  as	  the	  cholera	  epidemic,	  tuberculosis	  garnered	  little	  attention.	  Earlier	  tuberculosis	  epidemics	  in	  Hokkaido	  occurred	  far	  from	  the	  Meiji	  seat	  of	  power,	  and	  were	  thus	  easily	  ignored.	  Additionally,	  until	  1886,	  other	  factors	  including	  financial	  restraints,	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  more	  pressing	  diseases,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  tangible	  repercussions	  from	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis	  kept	  the	  Meiji	  government	  from	  instituting	  controls	  aimed	  at	  managing	  tuberculosis.14	  Financially,	  the	  Meiji	  government	  involved	  itself	  with	  growing	  Japan’s	  industrial	  strength,	  and	  with	  the	  funding	  of	  early	  military	  campaigns	  like	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  Authoritative	  Meiji	  medical	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  Sanitary	  Bureau	  	  (Eisei-­‐kyoku)	  in	  the	  newly	  established	  Home	  Ministry	  (Naimu-­‐shō),	  concerned	  themselves	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  59-­‐	  64.	  	  	  14	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  163.	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controlling	  the	  spread	  of	  smallpox,	  cholera,	  and	  dysentery,	  all	  of	  which	  earned	  the	  status	  of	  a	  controlled	  disease	  long	  before	  tuberculosis	  became	  one	  itself.15	  Only	  after	  the	  effects	  of	  tuberculosis	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  nation	  were	  perceived	  by	  the	  country’s	  leaders	  did	  tuberculosis	  merit	  the	  Meiji	  government’s	  attention.	  
	  
From	  City	  to	  Factory	  to	  Farm	  	  In	  1900,	  tuberculosis	  officially	  passed	  dysentery	  as	  the	  disease	  with	  the	  highest	  mortality	  rate.16	  As	  Japan’s	  push	  for	  industrialization	  continued,	  so	  did	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis.	  In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  factories,	  supplemented	  urban	  areas	  as	  principal	  sites	  through	  which	  tuberculosis	  spread,	  allowing	  tuberculosis	  to	  establish	  itself	  as	  an	  industrial	  disease.	  Because	  tuberculosis	  spread	  through	  air,	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  it	  spread	  quickly	  within	  dense	  urban	  areas,	  where	  housing	  for	  most	  city	  dwellers	  was	  cramped	  and	  required	  the	  use	  of	  common	  wells,	  waste	  bins,	  and	  toilets,	  and	  access	  to	  fresh	  produce	  was	  often	  in	  short	  supply.	  	  Conversely,	  in	  the	  countryside,	  people	  lived	  in	  less	  congested	  communities,	  and	  	  had	  increased	  access	  to	  fresh	  air	  and	  any	  produce	  they	  could	  grow.	  	  On	  average	  however,	  families	  living	  in	  the	  countryside	  were	  poorer	  than	  their	  urban	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  164.	  Controlled	  diseases,	  a	  category	  that	  included	  diseases	  like	  smallpox,	  cholera,	  and	  eventually	  tuberculosis,	  were	  diseases	  for	  which	  the	  Japanese	  government	  required	  mandatory	  reporting	  by	  physicians.	  This	  list	  of	  controlled	  diseases	  was	  comprised	  of	  the	  diseases	  that	  were	  deemed	  to	  pose	  the	  most	  serious	  threat	  to	  Japan	  as	  a	  country.	  These	  diseases	  were	  targeted	  with	  legislation	  aimed	  at	  monitoring	  and	  controlling	  their	  spread.	  Many	  of	  these	  diseases	  remained	  problematic,	  and	  thus	  in	  need	  of	  control,	  throughout	  the	  war	  years,	  and	  were	  the	  focus	  of	  SCAP	  eradication	  programs	  as	  well.	  	  	  16	  PH&W	  charts	  which	  compare	  tuberculosis	  mortality	  rates	  alongside	  the	  mortality	  rates	  of	  disease	  like	  cancer	  and	  dysentery	  often	  show	  the	  rates	  of	  these	  diseases	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  tuberculosis.	  When	  reading	  the	  PH&W	  charts,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  cancer	  and	  dysentery	  are	  not	  grouped	  as	  singular	  diseases.	  Instead,	  dysentery	  is	  grouped	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  similar	  disease.	  Likewise,	  the	  PH&W	  grouped	  all	  cancers	  together	  under	  a	  single	  heading.	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counterparts.	  In	  many	  cases,	  daughters	  from	  such	  families	  were	  sent	  to	  work	  in	  Japan’s	  growing	  textile	  industry.	  Their	  wages	  were,	  in	  turn,	  sent	  home	  to	  their	  families.	  	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  479,000	  women	  went	  to	  work	  in	  Japan’s	  growing	  textile	  industry.	  These	  women	  made	  up	  over	  90%	  of	  the	  industry’s	  workforce.	  The	  age	  of	  women	  factory	  workers	  ranged	  from	  the	  late	  teens	  to	  early	  twenties,	  but	  often	  factories	  employed	  girls	  as	  young	  as	  thirteen.17	  The	  living	  conditions	  that	  textile	  factory	  workers	  endured	  were,	  if	  anything,	  worse	  than	  those	  of	  urban	  areas.	  Though	  many	  factories	  were	  located	  in	  rural	  areas,	  the	  women	  sent	  to	  work	  in	  these	  factories	  had	  little	  access	  to	  anything	  resembling	  a	  healthy	  environment.	  Instead,	  they	  lived	  in	  large	  dormitories,	  which	  housed	  on	  average	  fifty	  workers,	  and	  were	  given	  little	  more	  than	  a	  futon	  to	  use	  as	  bedding.	  Meals	  consisted	  mainly	  of	  rice,	  most	  often	  with	  no	  meat	  or	  vegetables	  added	  as	  nutritional	  supplements.	  Women	  factory	  workers	  typical	  worked	  for	  upwards	  of	  fifteen	  hours	  with	  few	  breaks	  in	  rooms	  filled	  with	  floating	  fabric	  filaments	  or	  steamy	  machinery.	  Tuberculosis	  and	  other	  disease	  spread	  swiftly	  through	  the	  large	  dormitories	  and	  workrooms,	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  factories	  workers	  exhausted	  and	  deprived	  bodies.	  While	  the	  Meiji	  government	  had	  taken	  note	  of	  the	  threat	  tuberculosis	  posed	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  and	  thus	  themselves,	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  plight	  of	  textile	  workers	  remained	  largely	  overlooked	  until	  1913	  when	  Ishihara	  Osamu,	  a	  graduate	  of	  hygiene	  studies	  at	  Tokyo	  University,	  produced	  a	  study	  of	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  within	  the	  cotton	  factory	  worker	  population.	  In	  1903,	  the	  government	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  73-­‐75.	  
	   14	  
published	  a	  report	  titled	  “The	  Condition	  of	  Factory	  Workers”	  (Shokkō	  jijō)	  that	  concluded	  up	  to	  25%	  of	  women	  working	  in	  the	  textile	  industry	  had	  contracted	  tuberculosis	  at	  the	  workplace.	  When	  Ishihara	  began	  his	  survey	  by	  contacting	  both	  current	  factory	  workers	  and	  the	  families	  of	  women	  who	  had	  been	  sent	  home	  with	  the	  disease	  factory	  conditions	  had	  changed	  little.18	  	  Ishihara’s	  “Women	  Factory	  Workers	  and	  Tuberculosis”	  (Jokō	  to	  kekkaku)	  further	  illuminated	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  1903	  report.	  While	  Ishihara	  also	  concluded	  that	  roughly	  25%	  of	  all	  cotton	  workers	  contracted	  tuberculosis,	  he	  also	  found	  that	  tuberculosis	  accounted	  for	  50%	  of	  diseases	  caught	  by	  workers.	  Of	  those	  who	  contracted	  tuberculosis,	  48%	  were	  sent	  home.	  The	  remainder	  were	  allowed	  to	  return	  to	  work.	  Ishihara	  also	  found	  that	  of	  those	  dismissed	  from	  factories	  with	  tuberculosis,	  an	  alarming	  72%	  died	  of	  the	  disease.	  They	  had	  died	  after	  returning	  home	  to	  families	  that	  not	  only	  lacked	  the	  means	  to	  care	  for	  them,	  and	  had	  also	  lost	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  their	  yearly	  income.	  Ishihara’s	  report	  concluded	  with	  the	  startling	  statistic	  that	  women	  factory	  workers	  with	  tuberculosis	  exhibited	  nearly	  five	  times	  the	  mortality	  rate	  as	  any	  other	  group	  with	  the	  disease.19	  	  “Women	  Factory	  Workers	  and	  Tuberculosis”	  also	  failed	  to	  inspire	  improvements	  in	  living	  conditions	  for	  female	  workers.	  Improvements	  did	  not	  come	  until	  1930,	  when,	  spurred	  by	  increasingly	  negative	  reports	  and	  articles	  concerning	  factory	  conditions,	  many	  factories	  began	  to	  shorten	  work	  shifts,	  and	  provide	  better	  lodging,	  and	  provide	  access	  to	  health	  care.20	  These	  newly	  instituted	  changes	  did	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  As	  quoted	  in	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  80.	  	  19	  Johnston,	  The	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  83-­‐86.	  20	  Johnston,	  The	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  89.	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cause	  the	  rate	  of	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  amongst	  female	  factory	  workers	  to	  slowly	  drop.	  However,	  by	  this	  time	  men	  increasingly	  made	  up	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  the	  factory	  workers	  required	  to	  feed	  Japan’s	  imperial	  ambitions.	  Tuberculosis	  became	  a	  problem	  within	  the	  factories	  they	  worked	  as	  well,	  and	  would	  remain	  a	  severe	  handicap	  to	  Japan’s	  industrial	  output	  and	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  its	  workers	  well	  into	  the	  Occupation	  period.	  The	  presence	  of	  tuberculosis	  in	  Japan’s	  factories	  ultimately	  threatened	  more	  lives	  than	  those	  of	  the	  factory	  workers	  alone.	  The	  bodies	  of	  dismissed	  factory	  workers	  became	  the	  vectors	  through	  which	  tuberculosis	  also	  reached	  the	  rural	  villages	  	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  In	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  physical	  distance	  had	  isolated	  and	  protected	  rural	  communities	  from	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  that	  was	  already	  endemic	  in	  Japan’s	  urban	  centers.	  Returning	  factory	  workers	  carried	  tuberculosis	  from	  city	  to	  village,	  thereby	  ending	  these	  communities	  isolation	  from	  tuberculosis.	  Thus,	  by	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  had	  infiltrated	  Japan	  as	  a	  whole,	  threatening	  the	  lives	  of	  urban	  and	  rural	  citizens	  alike.	  
	  
Defining	  a	  Sickness	  	  Tuberculosis’s	  ability	  to	  spread	  quickly	  from	  body	  to	  body	  represents	  only	  one	  part	  of	  the	  story	  of	  its	  rise	  to	  epidemic	  proportions	  in	  twentieth-­‐century	  Japan.	  While	  at	  this	  time	  no	  cure	  for	  tuberculosis	  existed,	  Japanese	  medical	  professionals	  recognized	  that	  rudimentary	  tuberculosis	  treatment	  methods,	  such	  as	  isolating	  the	  tuberculosis	  sufferer,	  could	  be	  effective	  in	  halting	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  disease.	  	  Instead	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a	  rift	  in	  understanding	  aided	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis	  with	  Japanese	  medical	  professionals,	  who	  sought	  to	  understand	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  disease,	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Japanese	  public,	  who	  believed	  tuberculosis	  to	  be	  both	  a	  contagious	  disease	  and	  a	  hereditary	  defect.	  The	  friction	  caused	  by	  these	  opposing	  views	  prevented	  both	  government	  programs	  aimed	  at	  curbing	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis	  and	  the	  expertise	  of	  medical	  professionals	  from	  effectively	  protecting	  the	  Japanese	  populace	  from	  tuberculosis.	  Although	  the	  Meiji	  government	  had	  inadequately	  responded	  to	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  Japanese	  medical	  professionals	  displayed	  ample	  interest	  in	  both	  studying	  and	  treating	  tuberculosis.	  Tuberculosis	  spread	  through	  Japan	  with	  particular	  virulence	  because	  Japan	  was,	  as	  General	  Sams	  conjectured	  during	  the	  occupation,	  a	  country	  with	  backwards	  attitudes	  towards	  modern	  medicine.	  In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  Japanese	  medical	  professionals	  were	  as	  versed	  in	  recent	  tuberculosis	  research	  as	  their	  European	  and	  American	  peers	  were.	  	  During	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  amongst	  other	  nations,	  also	  faced	  tuberculosis	  epidemics.	  Consequently,	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  medical	  research	  within	  these	  countries	  dealt	  with	  disease	  like	  tuberculosis.	  The	  first	  breakthrough	  in	  understanding	  the	  spread	  of	  disease,	  and	  by	  extension	  tuberculosis,	  came	  with	  the	  widespread	  acceptance	  within	  the	  medical	  community	  of	  germ	  theory	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.21	  With	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21Germ	  theory,	  which	  postulates	  that	  diseases	  are	  caused	  by	  microorganisms	  too	  small	  for	  the	  human	  eye	  to	  see	  rather	  than	  by	  miasmas	  or	  other	  harmful	  environmental	  vapors	  (miasma	  theory),	  was	  proposed	  in	  the	  sixteenth	  century	  by	  Girolamo	  Fracastoro.	  While	  originally	  unpopular,	  germ	  theory	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knowledge	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  caused	  by	  microorganisms	  medical	  researchers	  had	  narrowed	  their	  search	  for	  a	  cure.	  With	  this	  goal	  in	  mind,	  Robert	  Koch	  began	  his	  research	  on	  the	  then	  unknown	  tubercule	  bacillus.	  	  Koch	  began	  his	  investigations	  regarding	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  1880s.	  He	  refuted	  the	  idea,	  popular	  both	  in	  Japan	  and	  worldwide,	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  a	  heritable	  disease.	  Koch	  believed,	  instead,	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  caused	  by	  disease	  particles,	  and	  it	  was	  these	  particles	  that	  he	  hoped	  to	  isolate	  and	  define.	  Koch’s	  search	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  tuberculosis	  was	  ultimately	  successful.	  In	  1882	  he	  published	  his	  paper	  “The	  Etiology	  of	  Tuberculosis”,	  in	  which	  he	  stated	  tuberculosis	  was	  caused	  by	  Mycobacterium	  tuberculosis.22	  This	  discovery	  would	  win	  Koch	  the	  1905	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  Physiology	  and	  Medicine.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  widely	  ignored	  throughout	  Japan.23	  After	  identifying	  the	  bacterium	  that	  caused	  tuberculosis,	  Koch	  turned	  his	  attention	  to	  formulating	  a	  cure.	  Assisting	  him	  in	  this	  process	  was	  bacteriologist	  	  Kitazato	  Shibasaburō,	  who	  had	  been	  sent	  by	  Japan’s	  Home	  Ministry	  in	  1885	  to	  study	  with	  Koch.	  By	  1890,	  the	  year	  Kitazato	  was	  to	  be	  recalled	  to	  Japan,	  he	  had	  already	  made	  several	  successful	  discoveries	  within	  Koch’s	  laboratory.	  Knowing	  the	  Koch	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  gained	  increasing	  popularity	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  through	  nineteenth	  century	  as	  the	  advent	  of	  new	  inventions,	  such	  as	  the	  microscope,	  and	  the	  work	  of	  scientists	  like	  Agostino	  Bassi,	  John	  Snow,	  and	  Louis	  Pasteur	  brought	  increasing	  credibility	  to	  the	  theory	  by	  proving	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  microorganisms.	  	  By	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  germ	  theory	  was	  posed	  to	  overtake	  miasma	  theory	  as	  the	  theory	  of	  choice	  to	  explain	  the	  spread	  of	  disease.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  although	  the	  medical	  community	  was	  ready	  to	  accept	  germ	  theory,	  the	  general	  public	  accepted	  germ	  theory	  more	  slowly.	  For	  more	  information	  on	  germ	  theory	  see	  Germ	  Theory:	  Medical	  Pioneers	  in	  Infectious	  Disease	  (2011;	  Washington	  D.C.:	  American	  Society	  for	  Microbiology)	  by	  Dr.	  Robert	  Gaines.	  Additionally,	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  systems	  of	  knowledge	  involved	  in	  the	  transition	  between	  miasma	  theory	  and	  germ	  theory	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Inescapable	  Ecologies:	  A	  History	  of	  Environment,	  Disease,	  and	  Knowledge	  (2007;	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press)	  by	  Linda	  Nash.	  22	  	  Robert	  Koch,	  The	  Atiology	  of	  Tuberculosis	  (New	  York:	  William	  R.	  Jenkins,	  1890),	  7.	  For	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  term	  Mycobacterium	  tuberculosis	  please	  see	  footnote	  6.	  23	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  189.	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was	  finally	  ready	  to	  embark	  upon	  tests	  of	  a	  tuberculosis	  vaccine	  that	  he	  and	  Kitazato	  had	  been	  working	  on,	  Kitazato	  wrote	  to	  the	  Home	  Ministry,	  asking	  that	  his	  stay	  in	  Koch’s	  laboratory	  be	  prolonged.	  While	  the	  acting	  Home	  Minister,	  Yamagata	  Aritomo,	  was	  pleased	  to	  hear	  that	  Koch	  and	  Kitazato	  had	  made	  significant	  progress	  towards	  producing	  a	  cure	  for	  tuberculosis,	  which	  was,	  unlike	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  
Mycobacterium	  tuberculosis,	  a	  subject	  in	  which	  the	  Japanese	  government	  and	  media	  took	  interest,	  he	  refused	  to	  extend	  Kitazato’s	  stay.24	  Within	  Japan,	  Kitazato	  found	  supporters	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  fight	  to	  keep	  him	  in	  Koch’s	  laboratory.	  Nagayo	  Sensai,	  a	  leading	  official	  in	  the	  Sanitary	  Bureau,	  claimed	  that	  to	  refuse	  to	  extend	  Kitazato’s	  stay	  would	  be	  “an	  academic	  embarrassment,	  a	  great	  misfortune	  to	  the	  Japanese	  people,	  and	  a	  loss	  of	  face	  to	  the	  Japanese	  state.”25	  Ultimately,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  found	  that	  saving	  face	  was	  worth	  granting	  Kitasato	  an	  additional	  year	  in	  Koch’s	  laboratory.	  	  In	  1890	  Koch	  produced	  tuberculin,	  the	  first	  vaccine	  cure	  for	  tuberculosis.	  While	  the	  news	  was	  well	  received	  around	  the	  world,	  hopes	  for	  tuberculin	  ran	  particularly	  high	  in	  Japan.	  Throughout	  1890,	  Japanese	  newspapers	  extolled	  tuberculin	  as	  the	  answer	  to	  Japan’s	  tuberculosis	  epidemic.	  By	  1891,	  when	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  received	  its	  first	  shipments	  of	  tuberculin	  for	  testing,	  news	  that	  tuberculin	  may	  be	  too	  good	  to	  be	  true	  had	  reached	  Japan.	  Hoping	  that	  such	  reports	  were	  false,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  tested	  its	  tuberculin	  not	  only	  on	  tuberculosis	  patients,	  but	  on	  leprosy	  sufferers	  and	  two	  syphilis	  patients	  as	  well.26	  In	  the	  end,	  tuberculin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  189.	  	  25	  As	  quoted	  in	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  200.	  	  26	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  204.	  	  
	   19	  
testing	  both	  within	  Japan	  and	  Europe	  seemed	  to	  suggest	  that	  while	  tuberculin	  may	  have	  been	  effective	  at	  alleviating	  some	  of	  tuberculosis	  symptoms,	  nothing	  had	  shown	  that	  tuberculin	  affected	  the	  tubercule	  bacilli	  themselves.	  Still,	  in	  June1891	  the	  Japanese	  Home	  Ministry	  approved	  tuberculin	  for	  use	  in	  several	  dozen	  hospitals.	  By	  that	  fall	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  hospitals	  had	  produced	  negative	  results,	  and	  by	  the	  spring	  of	  1892	  tuberculin	  had	  been	  declared	  by	  Japan’s	  leading	  doctors	  to	  be	  “ineffectual	  at	  best,	  and	  harmful	  at	  worst.”27	  Finding	  the	  tuberculin	  had	  failed	  to	  be	  a	  miracle	  cure,	  the	  Japanese	  medical	  community	  turned	  to	  prevention	  as	  a	  means	  to	  manage	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis.	  Tuberculin	  may	  not	  have	  proved	  a	  cure	  for	  tuberculosis,	  but	  other	  findings	  of	  bacteriological	  studies	  with	  the	  tubercule	  bacillis	  suggested	  that	  preventative	  techniques	  could	  go	  far	  in	  managing	  the	  disease.	  A	  German	  scientist	  named	  George	  Cornet,	  who	  like	  Kitasato	  had	  studied	  under	  Koch,	  released	  a	  theory	  concerning	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  in	  1891	  that	  purported	  that	  tubercule	  bacilli	  sank	  quickly	  in	  air,	  but	  could	  come	  to	  rest	  in	  water	  or	  on	  dusty	  surfaces.	  According	  to	  Cornet,	  it	  was	  possible	  in	  many	  cases	  to	  prevent	  tuberculosis	  through	  environmental	  control	  measures	  undertaken	  by	  the	  state	  and	  the	  individual.	  While	  Cornet’s	  ideas	  about	  how	  tubercule	  bacilli	  spread	  were	  ultimately	  incorrect,	  they	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  scientists	  and	  doctors	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  Japan.	  	  	  T.	  Mitchell	  Prudden,	  an	  American	  doctor,	  drew	  on	  Cornet’s	  ideas	  in	  order	  to	  prescribe	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  measures.	  In	  a	  1894	  issue	  of	  Harper’s	  Monthly	  he	  suggested	  that	  preventative	  measures	  against	  tuberculosis	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  both	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public	  and	  private	  environments,	  and	  that	  these	  measures,	  which	  included	  the	  elimination	  of	  excess	  dust	  and	  participating	  in	  tuberculosis	  education	  programs.	  In	  Prudden’s	  eyes,	  catching	  tuberculosis	  was	  less	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  individual	  than	  the	  government,	  which	  was	  tasked	  with	  both	  educating	  the	  public	  about	  tuberculosis,	  preventing	  its	  transmission	  and	  providing	  aid.	  28	  Ogata	  Masanori,	  a	  professor	  of	  bacteriology	  at	  Tokyo	  University,	  also	  engaged	  with	  Cornet’s	  work,	  though	  the	  conclusions	  he	  drew	  differed	  greatly	  from	  those	  of	  Prudden.	  To	  Ogata,	  it	  did	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  lay	  the	  responsibility	  of	  an	  individual’s	  health	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  the	  government.	  Ogata	  wrote,	  instead,	  as	  a	  doctor	  interested	  in	  combatting	  tuberculosis.	  He	  instead	  considered	  the	  maintenance	  of	  health,	  which	  he	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  natural	  result	  of	  proper	  lifestyle,	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  individual’s	  duties	  to	  the	  government.29	  Ogata	  saw	  Cornet’s	  work	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  Japan’s	  tuberculosis	  problem,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  method	  of	  prevention	  as	  Prudden	  and	  Cornet	  did.	  In	  his	  1892	  article	  for	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  Orientalist	  Society	  (Tōyō	  gakkai	  
zasshi),	  Ogata	  outlined	  four	  ways	  in	  which	  Japan	  could	  rid	  itself	  of	  tuberculosis	  through	  preventative	  measures.	  Three	  of	  Ogata’s	  measures,	  “increased	  personal	  resistance”	  through	  means	  such	  as	  exercise	  and	  improved	  diet,	  reduction	  of	  tubercule	  bacilli’s	  through	  the	  use	  of	  disinfectants,	  and	  taking	  personal	  measures	  to	  avoid	  spreading	  the	  disease	  correlated	  with	  Prudden	  and	  Cornet’s	  suggestions	  regarding	  tuberculosis	  prevention.	  Ogata’s	  final	  suggestion,	  however,	  hinted	  at	  the	  role	  of	  tuberculosis	  as	  a	  stigma	  in	  Japanese	  society	  in	  that	  it	  prohibited	  any	  contact	  with	  the	  tuberculosis	  sufferer,	  or	  their	  personal	  effects.	  	  The	  personal	  measures	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taken	  to	  avoid	  spreading	  disease	  were	  taken	  by	  many	  of	  Ogata’s	  readers	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  ostracization	  of	  tuberculosis	  patients	  was	  both	  socially	  acceptable,	  and	  medically	  sound.	  	  	   The	  ideas	  of	  Ogata	  and	  other	  physicians	  interested	  in	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  tuberculosis	  control	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  With	  tuberculin	  proven	  to	  be	  ineffective,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  and	  medical	  community	  turned	  away	  from	  pharmaceutical	  cures	  and	  embraced	  preventative	  measures	  as	  their	  primary	  response.	  While	  from	  the	  1910s	  prevention	  campaigns	  were	  carried	  out	  through	  the	  dissemination	  of	  pamphlets	  instructing	  the	  individual	  on	  how	  they	  were	  to	  play	  a	  part	  in	  stemming	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis,	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  was	  also	  institutionalized	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  sanatorium	  in	  the	  year	  1913.	  Tuberculosis	  prevention	  techniques	  were	  formalized	  in	  law	  by	  the	  Japanese	  government	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  some	  felt	  that	  these	  measures	  were	  not	  enough.	  Citing	  Europe’s	  success	  in	  lowering	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  rates,	  figures	  like	  Yamane	  Seiji,	  head	  of	  the	  Medical	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Metropolitan	  Police,	  spoke	  before	  Imperial	  Diet	  asking	  for	  more	  stringent	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  measures.30	  Like	  Yamane,	  many	  Japanese	  physicians	  felt	  that	  efforts	  at	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  were	  still	  lacking.	  They	  increasingly	  pushed	  for	  the	  building	  of	  public	  sanatoria.	  Following	  these	  physicians	  lead,	  newspapers	  also	  began	  running	  stories	  about	  various	  American	  and	  European	  sanatoria.	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Bowing	  to	  pressure,	  in	  June	  1913	  the	  Japanese	  government	  drafted	  a	  bill	  that	  required	  cities	  with	  over	  300,000	  inhabitants	  to	  open	  public	  sanatoria.31	  Each	  of	  these	  public	  sanatoria	  was	  expected	  to	  provide	  beds	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  	  cities’	  impoverished	  tuberculosis	  suffers.	  For	  example,	  drawing	  on	  a	  formula	  first	  proposed	  by	  Cornet,	  Japan’s	  Sanitary	  Bureau	  calculated	  that	  in	  1913	  Tokyo	  should	  have	  had	  around	  680	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  who	  could	  not	  afford	  care.	  Therefore,	  the	  Tokyo	  sanatorium	  should	  be	  able	  to	  house	  around	  500	  patients	  at	  any	  time.32	  The	  bill	  passed	  in	  1914	  making	  it	  mandatory	  for	  cities,	  such	  as	  Tokyo,	  Nagoya,	  Kyoto,	  Kobe,	  Yokohama,	  and	  Osaka,	  to	  provide	  public	  sanatoria.	  In	  most	  cases,	  however,	  construction	  did	  not	  begin	  for	  several	  years,	  leaving	  poor	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  without	  any	  government	  aid.	  By	  1922	  Nagoya,	  the	  last	  of	  the	  six,	  had	  opened	  the	  doors	  of	  its	  sanatorium,	  providing	  even	  the	  poorest	  of	  Japanese	  citizens	  with	  access	  to	  tuberculosis	  care.	   	  
Maintaining	  a	  Stigma	  	  Japanese	  medical	  authorities	  worked	  to	  curb	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis	  within	  Japan.	  However,	  they	  faced	  strong	  opposition	  in	  the	  form	  of	  contemporary	  social	  opinions.	  Despite	  Koch	  and	  Kitazato’s	  research	  proving	  otherwise,	  the	  Japanese	  public	  still	  viewed	  tuberculosis	  as	  a	  hereditary	  disease.	  When	  the	  news	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  caused	  by	  a	  bacterium	  spread	  throughout	  Japan,	  the	  public	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largely	  ignored	  it.33	  If	  anything,	  the	  idea	  that	  tuberculosis	  could	  be	  caused	  by	  a	  germ	  supplemented	  the	  idea	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  a	  hereditary	  condition.	  For	  the	  Japanese	  public,	  common	  sense	  held	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  both	  a	  hereditary	  disease	  exhibited	  by	  the	  physically	  inferior,	  and	  also	  that	  it	  was	  a	  disease	  that	  could	  be	  passed	  from	  such	  people	  through	  bacterium.34	  Most	  often,	  those	  known	  to	  have	  tuberculosis	  would	  be	  ostracized	  within	  their	  villages.	  Young	  men	  and	  women	  with	  the	  disease	  typically	  saw	  their	  marriage	  prospects	  vanish.	  The	  inflicted	  were	  judged	  to	  be	  somehow	  immoral;	  their	  past	  sins	  made	  visible	  by	  their	  symptoms.	  35	  To	  be	  sent	  to	  one	  of	  Japan’s	  newly	  established	  public	  sanatorium	  was	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	  being	  sent	  to	  one’s	  death.	  The	  public	  sanatoria	  were	  often	  so	  crowded	  that	  only	  the	  most	  terminal	  of	  patients	  were	  admitted	  so	  that	  they	  could	  await	  death	  without	  further	  transmitting	  the	  disease.	  If	  by	  some	  chance	  one	  did	  manage	  to	  survive	  the	  sanatorium,	  the	  stigma	  of	  their	  tuberculosis	  followed	  them	  home.36	  Unfair	  and	  unpleasant	  for	  those	  afflicted	  with	  the	  disease,	  the	  social	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis	  also,	  though	  ultimately	  both	  unfair	  and	  unpleasant,	  may	  not	  have	  hindered	  efforts	  to	  control	  tuberculosis.	  While	  Japan’s	  most	  talented	  medical	  professionals	  sought	  to	  change	  public	  ideas	  about	  tuberculosis	  in	  order	  to	  treat	  the	  disease,	  many	  of	  their	  less	  reputable	  peers	  acted	  in	  ways	  that	  maintained	  the	  status	  quo.	  Since	  the	  advent	  of	  Rangaku	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  Japanese	  medicine	  had	  become	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  both	  traditional	  Chinese	  medicine	  and	  Western	  medical	  science.	  The	  doctors	  themselves	  were	  subject	  to	  no	  formal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  185.	  34	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  107.	  35	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  107,	  116-­‐117.	  36	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  243.	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regulatory	  boards,	  nor	  were	  they	  the	  graduates	  of	  established	  medical	  schools.37	  Instead,	  most	  doctors	  learned	  their	  profession	  from	  the	  instruction	  of	  their	  predecessors	  or,	  if	  they	  were	  lucky,	  from	  the	  chance	  to	  look	  at	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  Western	  medical	  text.38	  From	  the	  Tokugawa	  period	  onward,	  patients	  who	  visited	  doctors	  expected	  to	  receive	  not	  only	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  their	  illness,	  but	  also	  a	  prescription	  that	  could	  be	  filled	  by	  a	  village	  pharmacist.	  The	  reception	  of	  a	  prescription	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  most	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  experience.	  In	  fact,	  doctors	  were	  not	  paid	  for	  their	  diagnostics	  services,	  as	  it	  was	  believed	  that	  they	  should	  provide	  these	  services	  out	  of	  sense	  of	  moral	  obligation	  to	  the	  community.	  	  Instead,	  doctors	  profited	  solely	  through	  the	  writing	  of	  prescriptions	  they	  wrote.	  Doctors	  that	  wrote	  prescriptions	  that	  appeared	  to	  work	  attracted	  patients	  and	  profits.39	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  several	  medical	  schools	  had	  been	  established	  in	  Japan.	  While	  the	  physicians	  that	  these	  schools	  produced	  still	  were	  not	  required	  to	  pass	  standardized	  medical	  board	  exams,	  they	  did	  benefit	  from	  better	  training	  than	  those	  who	  came	  before	  them.	  	  In	  the	  countryside,	  physicians	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  receive	  formal	  training.	  The	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis,	  coupled	  with	  these	  physicians’	  preoccupation	  with	  attracting	  high	  numbers	  of	  patients,	  rather	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  While	  one	  established	  medical	  school,	  the	  Seigō	  Insitution	  (now	  part	  of	  Tokyo	  University),	  existed	  in	  the	  late	  Tokugawa	  period,	  the	  majority	  of	  Tokugawa	  period	  physicians	  were	  trained	  informally.	  Those	  who	  were	  able	  to	  gain	  apprenticeships	  with	  established	  physicians	  in	  cities	  like	  Osaka,	  Nagasaki,	  and	  Edo	  benefitted	  from	  relatively	  rigorous	  training.	  Most	  country	  physicians	  were	  self-­‐trained.	  Y.	  Fujikawa,	  Clio	  Medic:	  Japanese	  Medicine,	  trans.	  John	  Ruhräh	  (New	  York:	  Paul	  B.	  Bober,	  1934),	  60.	  38	  For	  a	  more	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  medical	  training	  in	  the	  late	  Tokugawa/Meiji	  Restoration	  period	  see	  Fukuzawa	  Yukichi,	  The	  Autobiography	  of	  Fukuzawa	  Yukichi	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  pages	  21-­‐93.	  
39 Ellen Nakamura Practical Pursuits: Takano Choei, Takahashi Keisaku, and Western Medicine in 
Nineteenth-Century Japan (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005) 79.	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than	  providing	  accurate	  diagnoses,	  meant	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  often	  purposefully	  misdiagnosed.	  Instead,	  these	  country	  doctors	  would	  hide	  their	  diagnosis	  with	  a	  catch-­‐all	  name	  like	  “pulmonary	  consumption.”40	  While	  these	  alternative	  names	  were	  easily	  recognizable	  euphemisms	  for	  tuberculosis,	  they	  allowed	  a	  patient	  to	  deny,	  at	  least	  in	  name,	  that	  they	  had	  contracted	  tuberculosis.	  The	  use	  of	  catch-­‐all	  names	  also	  allowed	  doctors	  to	  maintain	  their	  clientele,	  who	  would	  surely	  disappear	  if	  it	  became	  known	  that	  the	  doctor	  diagnosed	  tuberculosis.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Meiji	  Government	  made	  tuberculosis	  reporting	  mandatory	  in	  1886,	  many	  doctors	  continued	  to	  list	  tuberculosis	  under	  a	  multitude	  of	  names.	  This	  practice	  made	  tuberculosis	  both	  hard	  to	  track	  and	  hard	  to	  treat.	  It	  also	  perpetuated	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis,	  diminishing	  any	  small	  victories	  that	  the	  government	  and	  medical	  authorities	  within	  in	  Japan	  had	  won	  against	  tuberculosis.	  The	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis	  was	  most	  vividly	  depicted	  in	  literary	  works	  from	  this	  period.	  While	  tuberculosis	  garnered	  the	  attention	  of	  writers	  around	  the	  world,	  in	  Japan	  tuberculosis	  was	  featured	  almost	  exclusive	  to	  negative	  effect.	  Western	  writers	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  centuries	  wrote	  often	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  “consumption”,	  depicting	  sympathetic	  youths	  whose	  vigor	  faded,	  leaving	  only	  their	  brilliant	  minds	  and	  unfinished	  works.	  These	  figures	  often	  took	  on	  an	  angelic	  beauty,	  and	  preternatural	  intelligence.	  Their	  deaths	  recalled	  candles,	  which	  shone	  most	  brilliantly	  before	  going	  out.41	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  70.	  41	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  disease	  in	  society	  see	  Susan	  Sontag’s	  Illness	  as	  Metaphor,	  which	  discusses	  metaphors	  that	  Western	  culture	  constructed	  like	  tuberculosis	  and,	  more	  recently,	  cancer.	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By	  comparison,	  the	  Japanese	  counterpart	  of	  youth	  lost	  to	  consumption	  was	  a	  much	  darker	  figure.	  	  While	  many	  Japanese	  writers	  wrote	  on	  tuberculosis,	  few	  were	  as	  intimate	  with	  the	  diseases	  itself	  as	  Dazai	  Osamu	  was.	  Dazai,	  who	  lived	  from	  1909	  to	  1948,	  was	  one	  of	  Japan’s	  most	  prolific	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  writers.	  During	  the	  war	  years,	  Dazai	  was	  excused	  from	  draft	  due	  to	  his	  chronic	  battle	  with	  tuberculosis.	  Drawing	  upon	  his	  experiences	  with	  the	  disease,	  Dazai	  wrote	  several	  novels	  which	  featured	  characters	  with	  tuberculosis.	  Dazai’s	  1945	  novel	  entitled	  Pandora’s	  Box	  (Pandora	  no	  hako)	  was	  written	  in	  the	  form	  of	  letters	  sent	  from	  a	  tuberculosis	  patient	  living	  in	  a	  sanatorium	  to	  his	  loved	  ones	  at	  home.42	  It	  is	  his	  postwar	  1948	  novel	  No	  Longer	  Human	  (Ningen	  shikkaku),	  however,	  that	  focuses	  on	  tuberculosis	  and	  	  its	  social	  stigma.43	  
No	  Longer	  Human	  recounts	  the	  story	  of	  	  Ōba	  Yōzō	  ,	  a	  young	  man	  living	  in	  Tokyo	  in	  the	  1930s.	  Throughout	  the	  novel,	  Ōba’s	  life	  falls	  apart	  as	  first	  his	  morals	  and	  then	  his	  health	  declines.	  Ōba’s	  moral	  decline,	  prompted	  by	  a	  night	  of	  debauchery	  and	  promiscuity,	  lead	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  both	  Ōba’s	  mental	  and	  physical	  health.	  In	  suggesting	  that	  Ōba’s	  immoral	  actions	  were	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  his	  infirmities,	  Dazai	  reflected	  on	  the	  social	  values	  of	  the	  time.	  After	  establishing	  that	  Ōba	  has	  acted	  immorally,	  and	  thus	  had	  forfeited	  his	  right	  to	  health,	  Dazai	  uses	  his	  novel	  to	  explore	  the	  link	  between	  stigma	  and	  sickness.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  identified	  two	  forms	  of	  illness	  that	  had	  the	  power	  to	  separate	  the	  individual	  from	  society.	  The	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Dazai Osamu, Pandora no hako (Pandora’s Box) in Dazai Osamu Sakuhinshu 3,  
(Pegasus, 2006). 43	  Dazai	  Osamu, Ningen shikakku (No Longer Human) (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2006). 
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of	  these,	  mental	  illness	  alienated	  Ōba	  from	  society,	  and	  eventually	  from	  those	  who	  cared	  about	  him.	  Ōba’s	  mental	  illness	  eventually	  proves	  to	  be	  his	  downfall,	  and	  at	  the	  novel’s	  close	  he	  is	  sent	  to	  a	  mental	  institution.	  It	  is	  Ōba’s	  physical	  illness,	  however,	  that	  must	  be	  hidden	  from	  society	  for	  fear	  of	  inciting	  stigma	  and	  isolation.	  Although	  it	  is	  never	  directly	  stated	  in	  the	  novel,	  Ōba’s	  illness	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  tuberculosis.	  Dazai	  never	  allows	  Ōba	  to	  formally	  recognize	  the	  disease	  that	  causes	  him	  to	  cough	  blood	  and	  take	  to	  his	  bed	  for	  days.44	  In	  doing	  so	  he	  both	  reflects	  on	  the	  tendency	  to	  deny	  tuberculosis,	  and	  highlights	  that	  tuberculosis	  is	  Ōba’s	  affliction.	  Dazai	  thus	  captures	  tuberculosis’s	  paradoxical	  nature	  as	  a	  disease	  that	  is	  both	  painstakingly	  overlooked,	  and	  a	  disease	  that	  was	  identified	  by	  the	  very	  efforts	  made	  to	  overlook	  it.	  Ōba’s	  eventual	  admittance	  to	  a	  mental	  institution	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  novel	  despite	  his	  friend’s	  knowledge	  of	  his	  deteriorating	  physical	  condition	  only	  reaffirms	  the	  lengths	  that	  people	  were	  willing	  to	  go	  in	  denying	  the	  presence	  of	  tuberculosis.	  Ōba	  could,	  and	  did,	  return	  from	  the	  mental	  institution	  to	  live	  a	  relatively	  normal,	  if	  much	  quieter,	  life.45	  Had	  his	  friends	  admitted	  him	  to	  a	  sanatorium	  his	  return	  to	  society	  would	  likely	  have	  been	  more	  difficult.	  
No	  Longer	  Human	  also	  highlights	  the	  ambivalent	  role	  of	  the	  medical	  community	  in	  treating	  tuberculosis.	  Dazai	  managed	  to	  depict	  the	  rift	  within	  the	  medical	  community	  caused	  by	  tuberculosis	  through	  his	  depiction	  of	  a	  pharmacy	  owner’s	  wife,	  Yoshiko,	  who	  functions	  as	  a	  stand-­‐in	  for	  the	  medical	  community.	  She	  represented	  both	  the	  physician	  who	  disseminated	  information	  about	  tuberculosis	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and	  treated	  the	  disease	  with	  modern	  medicine	  and	  the	  country	  doctor	  who	  faced	  tuberculosis	  with	  ambivalence,	  and	  was	  willing	  to	  prescribes	  cure-­‐alls	  instead	  of	  explaining	  the	  truth.	  When	  Ōba	  visits	  Yoshiko	  initially	  she	  was	  quick	  to	  identify	  his	  illness	  as	  tuberculosis,	  and	  to	  suggest	  that	  Ōba	  quite	  drinking	  alcohol,	  eat	  nutritiously,	  and	  rest.46	  In	  this	  sense,	  Yoshiko	  prescribed	  the	  treatments	  that	  Japan’s	  urban,	  authoritative	  medical	  professionals	  supported.	  She	  refused	  to	  leave	  Ōba’s	  disease	  unnamed,	  and	  deals	  with	  it	  as	  a	  medical,	  not	  a	  social,	  issue.	  As	  Ōba’s	  visit	  progresses,	  however,	  Yoshiko	  was	  transformed	  into	  the	  type	  of	  doctor	  that	  prescribes	  but	  does	  not	  diagnose.	  She	  hands	  Ōba	  “half	  a	  dozen	  medicines”	  including	  hormones	  to	  build	  his	  strength,	  calcium	  to	  settle	  his	  stomach,	  and	  morphine	  to	  dull	  the	  pain.47	  In	  doing	  so,	  she	  allowed	  Ōba	  to	  ignore	  the	  reality	  of	  his	  situation,	  which	  he	  himself	  was	  more	  than	  happy	  to	  do.	  In	  the	  end,	  Ōba	  traded	  his	  tuberculosis	  diagnoses	  for	  a	  more	  palatable	  morphine	  addiction.	  In	  this	  way,	  Yoshiko	  transitioned	  from	  being	  a	  figure	  that	  discussed	  Ōba’s	  disease	  with	  frankness	  to	  one	  who	  profits	  from	  him	  by	  selling	  him	  palliatives.	  The	  stigma	  and	  ambivalence	  surrounding	  tuberculosis	  as	  depicted	  in	  Dazai’s	  novel	  ultimately	  made	  any	  forceful	  regulation	  of	  the	  disease	  untenable.	  Several	  times	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1900	  and	  1945,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  issued	  laws	  making	  it	  mandatory	  for	  doctors	  to	  report	  patients	  exhibiting	  symptoms	  of	  tuberculosis.	  In	  1918	  the	  Japanese	  government	  moved	  to	  centralize	  public	  health	  under	  the	  newly	  created	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  control	  epidemic	  diseases	  including	  tuberculosis.	  The	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  quickly	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issued	  a	  series	  of	  what	  should	  have	  been	  strong	  regulatory	  acts	  against	  tuberculosis.	  The	  Tuberculosis	  Prevention	  Law	  of	  1919	  renewed	  mandatory	  reporting	  of	  tuberculosis,	  established	  a	  disposal	  system	  for	  the	  personal	  effects	  of	  tuberculosis	  sufferers,	  and	  set	  up	  quarantines	  for	  those	  found	  to	  have	  active	  tuberculosis.	  The	  act	  also	  required	  all	  communities	  of	  over	  50,000	  members	  to	  build	  and	  maintain	  their	  own	  sanatoria,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  beds	  available	  to	  tuberculosis	  sufferers.48	  The	  act	  failed,	  however,	  to	  provide	  any	  form	  of	  poverty	  relief	  to	  tuberculosis	  sufferers.	  Conditions	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  high	  rates	  of	  tuberculosis	  amongst	  Japan’s	  poor	  such	  as	  cramped	  living	  spaces	  and	  unsanitary	  environments	  were	  not	  addressed.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Tuberculosis	  Prevention	  Law	  any	  public	  education	  about	  tuberculosis.	  As	  Johnston	  points	  out,	  the	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  had	  exhausted	  its	  ability	  to	  legislate	  tuberculosis	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  had	  ignored	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis.	  	  	  The	  result	  was	  that	  there	  had	  been	  little	  change	  in	  public	  opinion	  about	  the	  disease.49	  While	  the	  years	  from	  1919	  to	  1930	  saw	  a	  small	  drop	  in	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  rates,	  the	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health’s	  failure	  to	  treat	  tuberculosis	  on	  both	  medical	  and	  social	  terms	  prevented	  its	  actions	  from	  having	  pronounced	  effects.	  Tuberculosis’s	  spot	  as	  the	  number	  one	  disease	  in	  Japan	  remained	  uninterrupted	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  was	  replaced	  with	  the	  Welfare	  Ministry	  in	  1938.	  	  Unlike	  its	  predecessor,	  the	  Welfare	  Ministry,	  which	  would	  remain	  in	  charge	  of	  both	  public	  health	  and	  education	  concerning	  health	  issues	  in	  Japan	  until	  it	  was	  replaced	  during	  the	  Occupation,	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  treating	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tuberculosis	  as	  both	  a	  medical	  and	  social	  issue.	  The	  new	  ministry	  joined	  forces	  with	  quasi-­‐official	  groups	  like	  the	  Anti-­‐Tuberculosis	  League	  to	  establish	  an	  estimated	  650	  health	  centers	  throughout	  the	  country.50	  These	  health	  centers	  were	  intended	  to	  supplement	  sanatoria	  as	  places	  that	  provided	  information	  about	  tuberculosis.	  	  Despite	  the	  increased	  promotion	  of	  information	  concerning	  tuberculosis,	  the	  disease	  remained,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  general	  public,	  a	  death	  sentence.	  Both	  the	  new	  health	  centers	  and	  sanatoria	  had	  difficulty	  attracting	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  who,	  like	  
No	  Longer	  Human’s	  protagonist	  Ōba,	  resisted	  being	  associated	  with	  the	  disease	  in	  any	  way.	  A	  piece	  of	  1937	  legislation	  that	  required	  doctors	  to	  not	  only	  report	  the	  names	  of	  patients	  with	  tuberculosis,	  but	  also	  the	  names	  of	  people	  believed	  to	  be	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  further	  encouraged	  the	  public	  to	  avoid	  health	  centers.	  This	  expanded	  list	  not	  only	  identified	  patients	  who	  had	  tuberculosis,	  but	  also	  any	  potential	  carriers	  as	  well.51	  Sanatoria	  continued	  to	  enjoy	  the	  reputation	  of	  glorified	  prisons	  where	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  were	  brought	  but	  could	  not	  leave.52	  The	  Welfare	  Ministry’s	  education	  programs	  also	  failed.	  While	  the	  government	  was	  increasingly	  willing	  to	  view	  tuberculosis	  as	  a	  social	  issue,	  it	  was	  unwilling	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  entirety	  of	  what	  the	  tuberculosis	  stigma	  entailed.	  The	  Welfare	  Ministry	  sponsored	  frequent	  pamphlet	  printings	  and	  events	  in	  urban	  areas,	  but	  they	  failed	  to	  deal	  with	  ideas	  about	  tuberculosis	  that	  were	  entrenched	  in	  rural	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  266.	  These	  groups	  were	  quasi-­‐official	  in	  that	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  was	  mainly	  comprised	  of	  medical	  professionals,	  but	  could	  also	  include	  laymen	  interested	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic.	  These	  groups	  were	  also	  quasi-­‐official	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  were	  called	  upon	  by	  the	  various	  groups	  within	  the	  government	  like	  the	  Welfare	  Ministry	  to	  serve	  as	  consultants,	  but	  were	  not	  governmental	  groups	  themselves.	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  Anti-­‐tuberculosis	  League	  and	  other	  similar	  groups	  see	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	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  and	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  51	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areas.	  Tuberculosis	  crusaders	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  refused	  to	  address	  the	  idea	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  hereditary,	  and	  wrote	  such	  ideas	  off	  as	  rural	  superstition.	  While	  they	  may	  have	  been	  little	  more	  than	  the	  material	  of	  folk	  beliefs,	  the	  Welfare	  Ministry’s	  failure	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  tuberculosis	  as	  a	  hereditary	  disease	  all	  but	  ensured	  that	  their	  explanations	  of	  the	  newest	  tuberculosis	  research	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.53	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  countryside,	  the	  Welfare	  Ministry’s	  attempts	  to	  spread	  information	  about	  tuberculosis	  failed,	  and	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  remained	  high.	  	  In	  the	  1940s,	  as	  Japan’s	  threw	  itself	  full-­‐force	  into	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  war,	  tuberculosis	  rates	  continued	  to	  grow.	  So,	  too,	  did	  the	  government’s	  involvement	  with	  disease	  control.	  While	  in	  the1930s	  the	  government	  came	  to	  see	  tuberculosis	  as	  a	  serious	  social	  issue,	  in	  the	  1940s	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  War	  transformed	  tuberculosis	  into	  a	  disease	  with	  serious	  political	  implications.	  In	  the	  early	  1940s,	  Japan	  required	  a	  constant	  influx	  of	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  its	  colonies	  throughout	  Asia,	  and	  to	  allow	  its	  armies	  to	  fight	  on	  multiple	  fronts.	  	  The	  drive	  for	  resources	  affected	  Japan’s	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  in	  several	  ways.	  First,	  because	  of	  the	  war’s	  enormous	  cost,	  Japanese	  subjects	  had	  less	  access	  to	  resources	  themselves.	  The	  government	  requisitioned	  many	  staples	  including	  food,	  cloth,	  and	  building	  materials	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  war	  effort.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  bodies	  of	  Japanese	  men,	  women,	  and	  even	  children	  contributed	  to	  the	  war	  in	  the	  form	  of	  physical	  labor	  within	  Japan’s	  factories.	  Together	  these	  two	  factors	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  Japanese	  subjects	  were	  both	  physically	  exhausted	  and	  unable	  to	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replenish	  the	  energy	  they	  had	  expended.	  As	  Japan’s	  people	  became	  increasingly	  overworked	  and	  malnourished,	  diseases	  spread	  quickly.	  	  Beneath	  the	  surface,	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  War	  affected	  tuberculosis	  by	  transforming	  it	  from	  a	  social	  issue	  to	  a	  patriotic	  issue.	  Japanese	  bodies	  were	  needed	  to	  fight	  the	  war.	  Therefore,	  the	  physical	  health	  of	  Japan’s	  people	  became	  a	  direct	  concern	  of	  the	  government.	  It	  became	  the	  duty	  of	  Japanese	  subjects	  to	  maintain	  healthy	  bodies	  so	  that	  those	  bodies	  could	  be	  used	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.54	  	  The	  government’s	  interest	  in	  regulating	  the	  bodies	  of	  its	  subjects	  prompted	  the	  first	  vaccine	  drives	  against	  tuberculosis.	  In	  1939	  the	  government	  undertook	  widespread	  tuberculosis	  screening,	  and	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  bring	  back	  tuberculin	  for	  use	  as	  a	  vaccine.	  These	  practices	  were	  formalized	  in	  the	  National	  Physical	  Fitness	  Law	  of	  1940,	  which	  mandated	  tuberculosis	  screenings	  for	  all	  males	  aged	  fifteen	  to	  nineteen	  and	  strongly	  encouraged	  screenings	  for	  all	  other	  demographics.	  Unlike	  earlier	  laws	  concerning	  tuberculosis	  control,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  made	  serious	  efforts	  to	  test	  all	  young	  men	  who	  feel	  into	  this	  age	  group.55	  1942	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  set	  of	  strict	  guidelines	  for	  those	  who	  tested	  positive	  for	  tuberculosis.	  Finally,	  in	  1943,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  attempted	  widespread	  inoculations	  of	  the	  Japanese	  public	  with	  a	  new	  tuberculosis	  vaccine,	  BCG	  (Bacillus	  Calmette–Guérin).56	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  272.	  	  55	  Johnston,	  Modern	  Epidemic,	  282.	  56	  Bacillus	  Calmette–Guérin,	  commonly	  called	  BCG,	  is	  a	  tuberculosis	  vaccine	  derived	  from	  
Mycobacterium	  bovis	  (Bovine	  tubercule	  bacillus).	  BCG	  was	  first	  developed	  by	  bacteriologist	  Albert	  Calmette	  and	  veterinarian	  Camille	  Guérin	  in	  1908.	  During	  the	  1910s,	  Calmette	  and	  Guérin	  tested	  BCG	  on	  animals,	  and	  found	  that	  it	  was	  effective	  in	  preventing	  tuberculosis.	  In1919,	  they	  transferred	  their	  project	  to	  the	  Pasteur	  Institute,	  and	  in	  1921	  BCG	  was	  first	  tested	  on	  humans.	  Although	  BCG	  was	  not	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By	  the	  1940s	  tuberculosis	  mortality	  rates	  within	  Japan	  reached	  210	  deaths	  per	  100,000	  people.57	  	  As	  the	  war	  entered	  its	  later	  stages	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  the	  government’s	  attempts	  at	  tuberculosis	  control	  fell	  apart.	  For	  both	  the	  Japanese	  people	  at	  home	  and	  its	  troops	  aboard,	  medical	  supplies	  and	  equipment	  became	  increasingly	  scarce.	  Programs	  aimed	  at	  controlling	  disease	  eventually	  fell	  to	  the	  wayside,	  replaced	  by	  other	  wartime	  concerns	  such	  as	  factory	  production	  and	  the	  cultivation	  of	  food	  supplies.	  By	  1944,	  the	  situation	  within	  Japan	  had	  deteriorated	  so	  badly	  that	  not	  even	  basic	  tuberculosis	  statistics	  were	  collected.	  An	  examination	  of	  tuberculosis	  statistics	  from	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  Occupation	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  tuberculosis	  rates	  rose	  during	  these	  years.	  Nonetheless	  the	  exact	  pace	  of	  this	  rise	  is	  lost	  to	  history.	  Tuberculosis	  testing	  and	  inoculation,	  if	  it	  continued	  at	  all,	  was	  haphazard	  and	  piecemeal.	  By	  the	  time	  Japan	  accepted	  its	  defeat	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Allied	  Forces	  in	  the	  August	  of	  1945,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  Japan	  tuberculosis	  rates	  had	  climbed	  to	  the	  highest	  ever,	  an	  estimated	  280	  tuberculosis	  deaths	  per	  100,000	  Japanese	  citizens.	  In	  the	  chaotic	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war	  they	  would	  only	  continue	  to	  rise.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  widely	  used	  before	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  it	  was	  available	  for	  use	  in	  the	  late	  1920s.	  For	  information	  on	  how	  BCG	  works	  as	  a	  vaccine	  against	  tuberculosis,	  see	  pages	  73-­‐78.	  57	  GHQ. Public Health and Welfare in Japan: Annual Summary 1948,	  39.	  For	  comparison,	  tuberculosis	  mortality	  rates	  in	  the	  United	  States	  had	  steadily	  declined	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  in	  1940	  tuberculosis	  represented	  only	  about	  45	  deaths	  per	  100,000.	  	  Tuberculosis	  mortality	  rates	  in	  Germany	  also	  fell	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  but	  rose	  slightly	  with	  the	  commencement	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  From	  1940	  to	  1945,	  Germany’s	  tuberculosis	  mortality	  rate	  rose	  by	  five	  deaths	  per	  100,000	  each	  year	  (from	  fifty	  per	  100,000	  in	  1940	  to	  fifty-­‐five	  per	  100,000).	  During	  the	  same	  time	  period	  tuberculosis	  mortality	  rose	  by	  seventy	  deaths	  per	  100,000	  each	  year	  (from	  210	  per	  100,000	  to	  280	  per	  100,000).	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CHAPTER	  3	  
THE	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  CONTROL:	  	  
RESTORING	  JAPAN’S	  MEDICAL	  AND	  SANITATION	  SYSTEMS	  	  General	  Crawford	  F.	  Sams,	  the	  person	  selected	  by	  General	  MacArthur	  to	  head	  the	  Public	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (PH&W)	  section	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  of	  the	  Allied	  Powers	  (SCAP),	  arrived	  in	  Japan	  with	  little	  information	  concerning	  the	  condition	  in	  which	  years	  of	  war	  had	  left	  the	  country.	  What	  he	  understood,	  however,	  was	  that	  the	  work	  of	  the	  PH&W	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  furthering	  of	  democracy	  in	  Japan.	  He	  believed	  that	  through	  the	  healing	  of	  bodies	  the	  PH&W	  could	  reinforce	  the	  “worth	  of	  the	  individual”	  to	  the	  Japanese	  public.	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  individual,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  would	  in	  Sams’	  words	  demonstrate	  “the	  essence	  of	  democracy.”58	  The	  benefits	  of	  democracy	  would	  be	  embodied	  by	  individual	  Japanese	  citizens	  through	  healthcare.	  	  While	  General	  MacArthur	  saw	  himself	  as	  the	  man	  who	  would	  bestow	  democracy	  on	  the	  Japanese,	  Sams	  envisioned	  his	  department	  to	  be	  “the	  handmaiden	  of	  democracy.”59	  In	  this	  way,	  under	  the	  mission	  statement	  of	  “preventing	  widespread	  disease	  and	  unrest,”	  the	  PH&W	  section	  of	  SCAP	  began	  its	  work	  in	  Japan	  on	  October	  2,	  1945.	  When	  Sams	  entered	  Japan	  as	  director	  of	  PH&W,	  many	  problems	  awaited	  him.	  Japan’s	  destroyed	  cities	  and	  sewage	  systems	  created	  unhealthy	  environments	  through	  which	  a	  host	  of	  diseases	  spread	  quickly,	  and	  in	  which	  tuberculosis	  continued	  to	  thrive.	  Most	  of	  Japan’s	  citizens	  were	  malnourished,	  making	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Sams,	  Medic:	  The	  Mission	  of	  an	  American	  Military	  Doctor	  in	  Occupied	  Japan	  and	  Wartorn	  Korea	  (New	  York:	  East	  Gate,	  1998),	  xv.	  
59	  Sams,	  Medic,	  xiv.	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bodies	  easy	  targets	  for	  disease,	  and	  hospitals	  stood	  crumbling	  without	  doctors	  and	  medical	  supplies	  to	  fill	  them.	  Faced	  with	  these	  immediate	  demands,	  Sams	  and	  the	  PH&W	  Section	  gave	  tuberculosis	  little	  attention.	  Instead,	  the	  first	  work	  that	  PH&W	  section	  undertook	  was	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  Japan’s	  medical	  and	  public	  health	  systems.	  Through	  the	  restructuring	  of	  both	  of	  these	  systems,	  the	  PH&W	  hoped	  to	  restore	  health	  by	  providing	  Japan	  with	  well-­‐trained	  professionals	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  medicine	  and	  sanitation.	  As	  the	  occupation	  progressed,	  Japan’s	  newly	  trained	  professionals	  would	  work	  alongside	  the	  PH&W	  section	  to	  combat	  disease	  and	  malnutrition	  and	  raise	  living	  conditions.	  While	  most	  of	  the	  early	  PH&W	  programs	  seemed	  unrelated	  to	  the	  control	  of	  tuberculosis,	  the	  early	  work	  of	  the	  PH&W	  proved	  instrumental	  in	  creating	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  PH&W	  section	  could	  work	  alongside	  Japan’s	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (MHW)	  to	  finally	  bring	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  under	  control.	  	  
Starting	  with	  Statistics:	  
Defining	  the	  Relationship	  between	  the	  PH&W	  Section	  and	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  	  The	  PH&W	  section’s	  first	  order	  of	  business	  was	  to	  inform	  itself	  about	  the	  health	  and	  environmental	  conditions	  within	  Japan.	  Sams	  immediately	  wrested	  all	  authority	  from	  the	  Japanese	  Home	  Ministry,	  and	  set	  about	  assessing	  the	  damage	  to	  Japan’s	  health	  systems.	  To	  aid	  in	  this	  process,	  he	  employed	  former	  employees	  of	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  in	  carrying	  out	  surveys	  and	  gathering	  data.	  During	  the	  first	  few	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months	  of	  the	  Occupation,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  poured	  over	  newly	  gathered	  statistics	  for	  disease	  morbidities,	  food	  supplies,	  and	  homelessness	  amongst	  others	  topics.	  	  The	  PH&W	  section’s	  interaction	  with	  the	  once	  powerful	  Home	  Ministry	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Occupation	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  how	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  bureaucrats	  would	  work	  together	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years.	  A	  reading	  of	  PH&W	  memos	  reveals	  that	  PH&W	  quickly	  assumed	  a	  position	  of	  authority	  in	  relation	  the	  Home	  Ministry.	  	  The	  PH&W	  section	  would	  issue	  a	  directive,	  which	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  was	  left	  to	  carryout	  to	  the	  best	  of	  its	  ability.	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  early	  directive	  dated	  October	  6,	  1945,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  ordered	  that	  the	  appropriate	  branch	  of	  the	  “imperial	  government	  must	  report	  on	  all	  epidemics	  deemed	  potentially	  harmful.”60	  the	  PH&W	  requested	  that	  these	  reports	  be	  gathered	  within	  a	  week	  and	  thereafter	  be	  delivered	  weekly	  until	  the	  PH&W	  section	  deemed	  them	  no	  longer	  necessary.	  The	  same	  memo	  also	  charged	  the	  imperial	  government	  with	  the	  task	  of	  furnishing	  all	  hospitals,	  including	  those	  for	  Occupation	  personnel,	  and	  with	  providing	  quick	  and	  unrestricted	  access	  to	  any	  further	  documents	  that	  the	  PH&W	  ministry	  might	  wish	  to	  see.61	  Throughout	  the	  following	  months,	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  continued	  to	  receive	  countless	  similar	  directives	  from	  the	  PH&W.	  	  Memos	  like	  the	  one	  above	  serve	  as	  a	  model	  for	  how	  the	  PH&W	  viewed	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  until	  the	  latter’s	  dissolution	  in	  1947	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (MHW).	  The	  PH&W	  section	  saw	  its	  role	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  Japan’s	  health	  systems	  as	  one	  of	  orchestrator	  and	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advisor.	  The	  American	  officers	  in	  charge	  of	  The	  PH&W	  section	  believed	  they	  would	  bring	  what	  Sams	  called	  “modern	  medical	  science”	  to	  Japan	  and	  would	  train	  Japanese	  personnel	  in	  the	  newest	  and	  most	  effective	  medical	  techniques.62	  What	  the	  PH&W	  section	  would	  not	  do	  was	  carry	  out	  the	  ground-­‐level	  work	  necessary	  for	  the	  restoration	  of	  public	  health.	  Nor	  would	  they	  provide	  the	  materials	  needed	  by	  the	  Japanese	  healthcare	  system	  on	  a	  long-­‐term	  basis.	  The	  enactment	  of	  the	  various	  immunization	  and	  sanitation	  campaigns	  and	  the	  production	  of	  medical	  equipment,	  medicines,	  and	  vaccines	  were	  to	  be	  turned	  over	  to	  the	  Japanese	  government	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  saw	  itself	  in	  the	  role	  of	  planning	  and	  training	  the	  Japanese	  officials	  and	  personnel	  who	  would	  follow	  their	  directions	  and	  provide	  manpower.	  	  
A	  Medical	  Makeover:	  
Restoring	  Hospitals	  and	  Reorganizing	  Medical	  Education	  	  Once	  the	  PH&W	  section	  had	  defined	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  and	  gathered	  the	  necessary	  information	  about	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Japanese	  public’s	  health,	  work	  on	  restoring	  Japan’s	  healthcare	  systems	  began	  in	  earnest.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  issues	  addressed	  was	  the	  state	  of	  Japan’s	  hospitals.	  	  From	  the	  statistics	  provided	  by	  the	  Home	  Ministry,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  knew	  that	  roughly	  one-­‐third	  of	  all	  Japanese	  hospitals	  had	  been	  destroyed	  by	  wartime	  firebombing.	  The	  PH&W	  calculated	  that	  this	  corresponded	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  over	  53,000	  inpatients	  beds.	  Drawing	  upon	  existing	  statistics,	  they	  also	  concluded	  that	  most	  of	  Japan’s	  still	  functioning	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hospitals	  were	  private,	  which	  generally	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  small,	  underequipped,	  and	  largely	  unregulated.63	  	  Still,	  the	  need	  for	  facilities	  in	  which	  to	  treat	  Japanese	  citizens	  was	  dire,	  and	  an	  immediate	  solution	  to	  the	  hospital	  problem	  needed	  to	  be	  found.	  	  The	  PH&W	  began	  its	  search	  for	  useable	  hospital	  facilities	  by	  drawing	  up	  a	  list	  of	  potential	  hospitals	  from	  the	  statistics	  they	  had	  gathered.	  Potential	  hospitals	  needed	  to	  be	  visited	  and	  inspected	  by	  PH&W	  personnel.	  	  Sams	  himself	  participated	  in	  these	  inspections	  by	  undertaking	  an	  extensive	  tour	  of	  Yokohama	  and	  Tokyo’s	  hospitals.	  	  Accompanied	  by	  an	  interpreter,	  and	  aided	  by	  a	  map,	  Sams	  slowly	  made	  his	  way	  through	  rubble-­‐strewn	  cities	  in	  search	  of	  functioning	  or	  salvageable	  facilities.	  	  The	  picture	  Sams	  draws	  of	  Japan’s	  hospitals	  immediately	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  is	  bleak.	  	  The	  first	  hospital	  he	  visited	  was	  a	  small	  police	  hospital	  in	  what	  had	  been	  a	  busy	  part	  of	  Yokohama.	  Upon	  approaching	  the	  hospital,	  Sams	  noticed	  that	  the	  windows	  had	  been	  painted	  over	  with	  black	  paint.	  This,	  his	  interpreter	  told	  him	  was	  done	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  the	  hospital	  would	  be	  overlooked	  in	  future	  fire-­‐bombing	  raids.64	  	  Sams	  wrote	  that	  the	  inside	  of	  the	  hospital	  was	  filthy.	  Broken	  equipment	  was	  strewn	  throughout	  the	  laboratories	  and	  operating	  rooms.	  	  Single-­‐use	  bandages	  sat	  in	  drawers,	  stained	  and	  thin	  from	  multiple	  applications	  and	  washings.	  The	  hospital’s	  beds	  had	  been	  confiscated	  long	  ago,	  and	  the	  tatami	  mats	  where	  sick	  and	  injured	  patients	  were	  lain	  covered	  the	  floors.	  In	  this	  same	  hospital,	  he	  came	  upon	  an	  X-­‐ray	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machine	  manufactured	  in	  Germany,	  which	  his	  interpreter	  informed	  him	  had	  not	  been	  usable	  for	  more	  than	  three	  years.	  X-­‐ray	  film	  had	  run	  out	  quickly	  during	  the	  war	  years,	  forcing	  physicians	  to	  use	  photographic	  paper,	  which	  provided	  only	  fuzzy	  images.	  When	  lower	  grade	  film	  ran	  out,	  the	  X-­‐ray	  machines	  were	  simply	  abandoned	  or	  scrapped	  for	  their	  parts	  and	  metal.65	  	  Sams	  toured	  many	  hospitals	  in	  the	  early	  months	  of	  the	  occupation,	  and	  found	  that	  the	  conditions	  he	  observed	  in	  the	  police	  hospital	  typified	  the	  conditions	  that	  Japan’s	  civilian	  hospitals	  were	  in	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  Conditions	  in	  Japanese	  tuberculosis	  sanatoria	  were	  much	  the	  same.	  Most	  sanatoria	  were	  situated	  in	  relatively	  isolated	  areas,	  and	  therefore	  avoided	  the	  heavy	  structural	  damage	  received	  by	  many	  of	  Japan’s	  hospitals.	  This	  did	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  sanatoria	  were	  better	  equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  patients.	  Unlike	  civilian	  hospitals,	  where	  doctors	  did	  not	  regulate	  the	  diets	  of	  their	  patients	  and	  food	  was	  typically	  provided	  by	  a	  patient’s	  family	  members,	  sanatoria	  generally	  provided	  meals	  for	  their	  patients.	  These	  meals	  were	  provided	  in	  effort	  to	  better	  quarantine	  tuberculosis	  patients	  and	  because	  most	  Japanese	  did	  not	  visit	  their	  family	  members	  after	  committing	  them	  to	  the	  sanatoria.	  Doctors	  also	  understood	  the	  important	  role	  nutrition	  played	  in	  their	  patients’	  recovery	  from	  tuberculosis.	  When	  Japan’s	  sanatoria	  ran	  out	  of	  food	  and	  medicine	  during	  the	  final	  months	  of	  the	  war,	  most	  patients	  saw	  no	  reason	  to	  remain	  sequestered	  within	  their	  isolating	  walls.66	  For	  the	  patients	  and	  their	  family	  members	  it	  was	  preferable	  to	  die	  at	  home	  than	  to	  starve	  in	  a	  sanatorium.	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   When	  the	  PH&W	  section	  surveyed	  Japan’s	  sanatoria	  in	  late	  1945	  and	  1946,	  it	  found	  that	  only	  25%	  of	  the	  beds	  in	  the	  country’s	  sanatoria	  were	  occupied.	  This	  occurred	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  total	  number	  of	  beds	  available	  to	  tuberculosis	  patients	  was	  grossly	  inadequate	  considering	  the	  size	  of	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic.	  While	  some	  of	  the	  sanatoria’s	  empty	  beds	  could	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  scarcity	  of	  food	  and	  supplies,	  many	  were	  simply	  never	  occupied	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Japanese	  not	  only	  avoided	  visiting	  their	  relatives	  in	  sanatoria,	  but	  also	  avoided	  sending	  loved	  ones	  to	  sanatoria	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  During	  the	  war	  years,	  little	  had	  changed	  to	  dispel	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis,	  and	  sanatoria	  were	  still	  considered	  places	  where	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  went	  to	  die,	  not	  to	  be	  treated.67	  Until	  the	  later	  years	  of	  the	  occupation,	  the	  PH&W	  focused	  on	  both	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  beds	  within	  sanatoria	  and	  on	  filling	  existing	  beds.	  	  	   The	  PH&W	  section	  found	  the	  initial	  answer	  to	  the	  Japan’s	  hospital	  shortage	  in	  country’s	  military	  hospitals.	  The	  military	  hospitals,	  which	  numbered	  320	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  were	  in	  remarkably	  better	  condition	  than	  Japan’s	  civilian	  hospitals	  and	  sanatoria.	  	  During	  the	  war,	  the	  military	  hospitals	  frequently	  allowed	  to	  confiscate	  supplies	  and	  equipment	  from	  civilian	  institutions.	  Many	  of	  the	  military	  hospital	  Sams	  visited	  still	  had	  hospital	  beds	  and	  other	  necessary	  equipment.	  While	  the	  equipment	  in	  military	  hospitals	  was	  often	  old	  or	  outdated,	  it	  was	  in	  good	  enough	  condition	  to	  be	  used	  to	  treat	  patients.	  If	  medicine	  were	  to	  be	  found	  within	  Japan	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  it	  was	  often	  within	  these	  military	  hospitals.68	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The	  PH&W	  section’s	  hospital	  surveys	  found	  Japan’s	  military	  hospitals	  full	  of	  medicine,	  equipment,	  and	  veterans.	  Conversely,	  it	  found	  the	  civilian	  hospitals	  devoid	  of	  supplies,	  and,	  consequently,	  of	  patients,	  who	  simply	  stopped	  seeking	  medical	  help	  that	  was	  unavailable.	  To	  solve	  this	  problem,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  declared	  all	  military	  hospitals	  open	  to	  civilian	  patients.	  Sams	  chose	  Tokyo’s	  First	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Army	  Hospital	  in	  Tokyo,	  which	  he	  renamed	  the	  First	  National	  Hospital,	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  new	  model	  hospital	  for	  Japan.69	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  it	  confiscated	  all	  military	  hospitals	  for	  public	  use,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  stripped	  any	  war	  veterans	  currently	  being	  treated	  within	  these	  hospitals	  of	  their	  special	  health	  care	  privileges.	  This	  meant	  that	  war	  veterans	  no	  longer	  had	  first	  priority	  when	  it	  came	  to	  care,	  medicine,	  and	  hospital	  beds.	  	  The	  PH&W	  did	  not,	  as	  MacArthur	  had	  done	  with	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  Japanese	  government,	  immediately	  purge	  these	  hospitals	  of	  staff	  associated	  with	  the	  military.	  As	  Sams	  points	  out	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  if	  they	  had	  done	  so,	  no	  doctors	  would	  be	  available	  to	  tend	  to	  patients.70	  By	  1948,	  however,	  all	  hospital	  staff	  members	  who	  had	  been	  career	  officers	  were	  purged	  and	  replaced	  by	  civilian	  doctors	  who	  had	  been	  trained	  during	  the	  Occupation	  .71	  Thus,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1948,	  the	  transformation	  of	  Japan’s	  military	  hospitals	  into	  national	  hospitals	  that	  tended	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  civilians	  was	  largely	  achieved.	  While	  these	  early	  national	  hospitals	  lacked	  the	  beds	  and	  supplies	  needed	  to	  treat	  all	  of	  Japan’s	  sick	  and	  injured,	  conditions	  within	  hospitals	  slowly	  improved	  throughout	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the	  occupation	  period.	  Unable	  to	  immediately	  build	  new	  hospitals	  and	  fully	  supply	  existing	  institutions,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  turned	  its	  attention	  to	  reforming	  hospital	  regulations.	  Such	  efforts	  were	  made	  in	  order	  to	  insure	  that	  the	  Japanese	  citizens	  who	  were	  treated	  in	  hospitals	  received	  proper	  care.	  Reforming	  Japan’s	  hospital	  systems	  involved	  two	  major	  interrelated	  projects:	  the	  closing	  of	  Japan’s	  problematic	  private	  hospitals,	  and	  the	  overhaul	  of	  the	  Japanese	  medical	  education	  system.	  Both	  of	  these	  goals	  were	  largely	  achieved	  in	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  Occupation.	  	  Once	  the	  PH&W	  section	  had	  opened	  all	  hospitals	  that	  it	  could	  make	  immediately	  available	  to	  the	  public,	  it	  began	  the	  processing	  of	  closing	  private	  hospitals,	  many	  of	  which	  the	  section	  believed	  should	  not	  have	  been	  treating	  patients	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  existence	  of	  these	  hospitals	  arose	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  training	  discrepancies	  between	  doctors	  that	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  but	  continued	  to	  exist	  up	  to	  the	  Occupation.	  These	  training	  discrepancies	  created	  a	  stratification	  within	  Japan’s	  civilian	  hospital	  system,	  which	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  occupation	  included	  large	  public	  hospitals	  and	  small	  un-­‐regulated	  private	  hospitals.	  
72	   While	  the	  twentieth	  century	  ushered	  in	  an	  era	  of	  modern	  medical	  schools	  in	  Japan,	  it	  did	  not	  bring	  about	  standardized	  medical	  training.	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Occupation,	  Japan	  had	  eighteen	  officially	  designated	  university-­‐level	  medical	  schools.	  At	  the	  time,	  there	  was	  no	  medical	  examination	  board	  that	  standardized	  curriculum	  in	  these	  universities,	  but	  the	  individual	  medical	  schools	  did	  hold	  their	  students	  to	  rigorous	  standards.	  Students	  who	  were	  accepted	  into	  these	  schools,	  for	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instance,	  were	  expected	  to	  have	  completed	  three	  years	  of	  university	  level	  science	  courses	  before	  matriculation.	  Their	  medical	  education	  comprised	  an	  additional	  four	  years	  of	  study,	  with	  two	  of	  those	  years	  dedicated	  to	  basic	  sciences	  and	  two	  to	  clinical	  medicine.73	  Graduates	  of	  these	  schools	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  first-­‐rate.	  As	  such,	  these	  doctors	  were	  able	  to	  seek	  employment	  in	  Japan’s	  larger	  hospitals,	  which	  were	  located	  in	  major	  urban	  areas.	  As	  such,	  these	  first-­‐rate	  physicians	  also	  had	  access	  to	  the	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  medical	  equipment	  and	  research.	  The	  less	  trained	  doctors	  were,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  typically	  gradates	  of	  Japan’s	  medical	  technical	  schools.	  Called	  senmon	  gakkō,	  the	  popularity	  of	  these	  less	  medical	  technical	  schools	  	  skyrocketed	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  due	  both	  to	  the	  selectiveness	  of	  the	  university	  medical	  schools	  and	  the	  growing	  need	  for	  doctors	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  during	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  war.	  While	  only	  ten	  medical	  technical	  schools	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  year	  1938,	  by	  1945	  over	  fifty-­‐one	  were	  in	  operation.	  	  Graduates	  of	  Japan’s	  medical	  technical	  schools	  were	  not	  required	  to	  take	  any	  university	  level	  courses	  prior	  to	  entrance	  into	  the	  technical	  school’s	  four	  year	  long	  medical	  programs.	  Of	  these	  fifty-­‐one	  schools,	  nineteen	  of	  the	  medical	  technical	  schools	  were	  associated	  with	  Japan’s	  medical	  universities	  and	  thus	  held	  their	  students	  to	  higher	  standards.	  Most	  technical	  schools	  operated	  without	  such	  affiliations.	  Unaffiliated	  schools	  were	  particularly	  problematic	  because	  successful	  graduates	  of	  these	  technical	  schools	  were	  automatically	  issued	  medical	  licenses	  upon	  graduation,	  just	  like	  the	  graduates	  the	  country’s	  medical	  universities.74	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As	  the	  need	  for	  physicians	  grew	  during	  the	  war	  years,	  many	  poorly	  trained	  medical	  students	  were	  hastily	  awarded	  medical	  licenses	  and	  sent	  to	  practice	  medicine	  within	  Japan.	  While	  large	  public	  hospitals	  would	  not	  employ	  graduates	  of	  the	  medical	  technical	  schools,	  these	  physicians	  could	  go	  into	  private	  practice.	  Physicians	  who	  lived	  in	  large	  urban	  areas	  could	  work	  for	  smaller	  clinics	  that	  took	  only	  outpatients.	  They	  were	  also	  allowed	  to	  establish	  private	  hospitals,	  provided	  that	  the	  hospitals	  have	  less	  than	  ten	  beds.75	  	  The	  existence	  of	  private	  hospitals	  became	  a	  problem	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  physicians	  that	  ran	  these	  hospitals	  were	  prohibited	  from	  referring	  their	  patients,	  should	  the	  patient’s	  infirmity	  turn	  serious,	  to	  first-­‐rate,	  i.e.	  public,	  hospitals.	  Thus,	  first-­‐rate	  and	  second-­‐rate	  physicians	  remained	  segregated	  not	  only	  during	  the	  school	  years,	  but	  for	  the	  entirety	  of	  their	  careers.	  In	  general	  first-­‐rate	  doctors	  and	  hospitals	  catered	  to	  the	  urban	  elite,	  while	  their	  second-­‐rate	  counterparts	  served	  the	  less	  fiscally	  fortunate	  and	  rural	  Japan.76	  	  The	  segregation	  upheld	  between	  first-­‐rate	  and	  second-­‐rate	  doctors	  ensured	  that	  quality	  of	  care	  remained	  poor	  in	  private	  hospitals	  and	  clinics.	  The	  inability	  of	  second-­‐rates	  physicians	  to	  refer	  patients	  to	  first-­‐rate	  physicians	  meant	  that	  little	  exchange	  occurred	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  Thus,	  after	  medical	  school	  second-­‐rates	  physicians	  were	  provided	  with	  no	  opportunities	  to	  improve	  their	  skills77.	  Sams	  believed	  that	  even	  had	  these	  physicians	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  their	  first-­‐rate	  peers,	  they	  would	  have	  had	  little	  incentive	  to	  improve	  their	  skills.	  Unlike	  first-­‐rate	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physicians,	  who	  enjoyed	  a	  spot	  on	  the	  hospitals	  payroll,	  physicians	  involved	  in	  private	  practice	  relied	  on	  quick	  patient	  turnover	  to	  make	  a	  living.	  	  As	  in	  earlier	  times,	  the	  end	  of	  each	  patient	  appointment	  a	  private	  physician	  would	  provide	  their	  patient	  with	  a	  small	  supply	  of	  medicine.	  In	  return,	  they	  were	  paid	  a	  small	  sum	  of	  money.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  such	  physicians	  to	  see	  as	  many	  patients	  as	  possible,	  not	  to	  provide	  the	  best	  care	  possible.78	  Within	  this	  system,	  patient	  care	  at	  private	  clinics	  was	  unlikely	  to	  improve.	  	  Conditions	  within	  private	  hospitals	  were	  also	  problematic.	  Such	  hospitals	  had	  never	  been	  subject	  to	  any	  form	  of	  regulation,	  and	  therefore	  varied	  widely	  in	  terms	  of	  quality	  of	  care	  and	  level	  of	  sanitation.	  	  Richard	  Berlin,	  a	  naval	  physician	  who	  aided	  in	  hospital	  rehabilitation	  near	  Nagasaki	  in	  1945,	  wrote	  about	  conditions	  in	  private	  hospitals	  in	  an	  article	  for	  the	  journal	  Scientific	  Monthly.	  Although	  Nagasaki’s	  main	  public	  hospital	  lay	  outside	  the	  blast	  radius	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  dropped	  on	  Nagasaki	  in	  August	  1945,	  the	  hospital	  was	  deemed	  unfit	  by	  Berlin’s	  team	  upon	  their	  arrival.	  During	  the	  search	  for	  a	  location	  that	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  temporary	  facility,	  Berlin	  toured	  many	  of	  Nagasaki’s	  private	  hospitals.	  He	  described	  conditions	  within	  these	  hospitals	  as	  being	  “dark,	  filthy,	  and	  fetid.”	  Straw	  mats	  were	  used	  in	  place	  of	  bedding,	  and	  patients	  were	  often	  packed	  three	  to	  a	  “bed”.	  79	  	   While	  Berlin’s	  recollections	  reflect	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  conditions	  in	  private	  hospitals,	  Sams	  and	  others	  in	  the	  PH&W	  section	  considered	  all	  private	  hospitals	  a	  problem.	  Because	  private	  hospitals	  numbered	  in	  the	  thousands,	  ensuring	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that	  each	  hospital	  met	  a	  minimum	  standard	  of	  operation	  would	  require	  more	  manpower	  than	  the	  PH&W	  and	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Home	  could	  spare.	  Furthermore,	  the	  PH&W	  felt	  confident	  that	  existing	  public	  hospitals	  could	  meet	  their	  needs	  unlike	  the	  Japan’s	  second-­‐rate	  doctors,	  whom	  Sams	  hoped	  could	  quickly	  benefit	  from	  additional	  training	  and	  be	  allowed	  to	  practice	  again,	  Japan’s	  second-­‐rate	  hospitals	  were	  unsalvageable.	  80	  The	  occupation	  period	  therefore	  became	  a	  time	  when	  the	  hospitals	  both	  opened	  and	  closed	  within	  Japan.	  Public	  hospitals	  opened	  their	  doors	  to	  both	  civilians,	  and	  to	  physicians.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  physicians	  who	  were	  not	  on	  a	  particular	  hospital’s	  payroll	  could	  refer	  their	  own	  patients	  to	  the	  hospital.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  national	  hospital	  were	  opening	  their	  doors	  within	  Japan,	  private	  hospitals	  were	  closing	  their	  own.	  By	  1948,	  all	  private	  hospitals	  were	  required	  to	  have	  shut	  down,	  or	  to	  have	  become	  clinics,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  national	  hospitals	  had	  reached	  116.81	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  Occupation	  Period,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  and	  the	  MHW	  focused	  on	  stocking	  and	  improving	  the	  newly	  established	  public	  hospitals.	  While	  the	  creation	  of	  national	  hospitals	  and	  the	  closing	  of	  private	  hospitals	  helped	  close	  the	  gap	  in	  inpatient	  care	  inherent	  in	  Japan’s	  pre-­‐occupation	  medical	  system,	  the	  PH&W	  was	  also	  faced	  with	  the	  task	  of	  restructuring	  Japan’s	  bifurcated	  medical	  education	  system.	  To	  accomplish	  this	  task,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  first	  approached	  the	  Japanese	  Medical	  Association	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  institutions	  expertise	  in	  working	  with	  Japan’s	  medical	  system.	  	  Their	  request	  for	  aid	  in	  accessing	  the	  quality	  of	  Japan’s	  medical	  education	  programs	  was,	  however,	  met	  with	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disinterest.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  decided	  instead	  to	  form	  a	  new	  council	  composed	  of	  Japanese	  physicians	  to	  aid	  in	  this	  task.	  After	  meeting	  several	  times	  throughout	  1946	  to	  discuss	  potential	  council	  members,	  the	  PH&W	  formalized	  the	  Japanese	  Council	  on	  Medical	  Education.	  82	  In	  1947	  the	  Japanese	  Council	  on	  Medical	  Education	  undertook	  a	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  Japan’s	  existing	  medical	  schools,	  reclassifying	  them	  into	  either	  class	  A	  or	  class	  B	  schools.	  Class	  A	  schools	  were	  those	  that	  were	  in	  possession	  of	  both	  medical	  training	  equipment	  and	  a	  sufficiently	  educated	  faculty.	  These	  schools	  were	  eligible	  for	  consideration	  as	  university	  level	  medical	  schools.	  Class	  B	  schools,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  required	  standards	  to	  become	  medical	  universities.	  Perhaps	  unsurprisingly,	  all	  of	  Japan’s	  eighteen	  official	  medical	  university	  were	  designated	  as	  class	  A	  medical	  schools.	  They	  were	  joined	  by	  forty-­‐five	  technical	  schools,	  twenty-­‐seven	  of	  which	  were	  quickly	  designated	  temporary	  universities	  and	  would	  become	  full	  universities	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Council	  on	  Medical	  Education	  agreed	  to	  allow	  the	  remaining	  eighteen	  class	  A	  	  technical	  schools	  	  to	  stay	  open	  until	  1952,	  provided	  that	  the	  these	  schools	  	  operated	  in	  conjunction	  with	  an	  established	  medical	  school.83	  	  The	  Japanese	  Council	  on	  Medical	  Education	  also	  formulated	  a	  new	  curriculum	  to	  be	  used	  in	  all	  medical	  schools.	  Upon	  first	  examining	  the	  Japanese	  medical	  school	  curriculum,	  the	  PH&W	  system	  determined	  that	  it	  was	  largely	  modeled	  on	  a	  pre-­‐war	  German	  model.	  As	  such,	  Japanese	  medical	  courses	  were	  largely	  didactic	  and	  theory	  laden.	  Laboratory	  training	  and	  clinical	  experience	  was	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lacking	  amongst	  Japanese	  physicians	  and	  medical	  students.	  84	  Together,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Council	  on	  Medical	  Education	  developed	  a	  curriculum	  for	  Japanese	  medical	  schools	  that	  incorporated	  not	  only	  didactic	  training,	  but	  practical	  skill	  work.	  In	  this	  new	  curriculum,	  clinical	  training	  comprised	  53%	  of	  the	  students’	  total	  training.	  All	  students	  were	  required	  to	  attend	  autopsy	  labs,	  preform	  dissections,	  and	  aid	  in	  experiments	  preformed	  in	  the	  medical	  school	  laboratories.85	  	  The	  final	  change	  to	  Japan’s	  medical	  curriculum	  was	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  national	  medical	  board	  exam	  in	  1947.	  From	  that	  year	  onward,	  all	  graduating	  Japanese	  medical	  students	  were	  required	  to	  pass	  a	  standardized	  test	  that	  was	  then	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Council	  on	  Examinations	  for	  Medical	  Licensure,	  a	  	  group	  overseen	  at	  first	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare.	  The	  Council	  on	  Examinations	  for	  Medical	  Licensure,	  which	  consisted	  of	  an	  annually	  selected	  committee	  of	  seventeen	  highly	  regarded	  Japanese	  physicians	  across	  all	  fields,	  supervised	  the	  new	  biannual	  four-­‐day	  medical	  exams.	  The	  rigorous	  exam	  was	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  only	  the	  most	  highly	  qualified	  students	  passed.86	  	  The	  changes	  made	  to	  Japan’s	  medical	  education	  system	  were	  crucial	  to	  the	  restoration	  of	  health	  in	  Japan.	  While	  several	  hundred	  Japanese	  medical	  students	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe	  to	  study	  in	  1945,	  by	  1947	  Japan	  had	  produced	  its	  first	  board-­‐certified	  medical	  class.	  The	  incorporation	  of	  practical	  teaching	  in	  medical	  schools	  produced	  Japanese	  physicians	  who	  were	  reported	  to	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have	  been	  highly	  proficient	  in	  treating	  their	  patients.87	  While	  only	  47,798	  doctors	  were	  practicing	  in	  the	  year	  1945,	  by	  1948	  this	  number	  had	  increased	  to	  68,820.	  The	  number	  of	  physicians	  would	  continue	  to	  grow	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  occupation	  period.	  The	  quality	  of	  Japan’s	  hospital	  systems	  improved	  alongside	  that	  of	  their	  medical	  staff.	  The	  PH&W’s	  transfer	  of	  military	  and	  naval	  hospitals	  to	  civilian	  hands	  immediately	  opened	  thousands	  of	  beds	  to	  sick	  and	  injured	  Japanese	  civilians.	  By	  1952,	  3,577	  hospitals	  operated	  within	  Japan.	  Bed	  capacity	  increased	  from	  244,709	  beds	  in	  1945	  to	  312,265	  in	  1952.	  While	  this	  jump	  in	  bed	  capacity	  may	  not	  seem	  overly	  impressive,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  many	  of	  the	  beds	  counted	  in	  1945	  were	  little	  more	  than	  tatami	  mats.	  By	  1952,	  these	  makeshift	  beds	  had	  been	  replaced	  with	  proper	  hospital	  beds.88	  Sams	  attributed	  this	  success	  in	  rehabilitating	  Japan’s	  medical	  system	  to	  his	  section’s	  willingness	  to	  “push	  multiple	  wheels	  at	  once.”	  He	  believed	  that	  Japan’s	  health-­‐related	  problems	  were	  multi-­‐casual,	  and	  thus	  required	  multiple	  solutions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Japan’s	  medical	  system,	  these	  solutions	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  hospital	  reform	  and	  medical	  education	  restructuring.	  When	  the	  PH&W	  section’s	  attention	  turned	  to	  the	  issue	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  later	  years	  of	  the	  Occupation,	  this	  multiple	  solutions	  approach	  would	  again	  be	  used	  to	  great	  effect.	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Systematizing	  Sanitation:	  
Sanitation	  Training	  and	  Early	  Vaccination	  Campaigns	  	  While	  the	  steps	  taken	  to	  improve	  Japan’s	  medical	  systems	  would	  lay	  the	  foundation	  to	  in-­‐patient	  treatment	  of	  tuberculosis	  sufferers,	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  preventative	  care	  used	  to	  halt	  the	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis	  were	  first	  tested	  in	  the	  PH&W	  section’s	  early	  sanitation	  programs.	  	  When	  the	  PH&W	  section	  entered	  Japan	  they	  were	  faced	  with	  the	  dual	  problems	  of	  recreating	  clean	  living	  conditions,	  and	  halting	  the	  spread	  of	  what	  Sams	  called	  “wildfire	  diseases”	  like	  typhus	  and	  dysentery,	  which	  spread	  quickly	  throughout	  Japan’s	  destroyed	  city	  neighborhoods.	  	  The	  occupation’s	  sanitation	  issues	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  destruction	  caused	  by	  the	  war.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  discussions	  of	  wartime	  destruction,	  including	  those	  provided	  by	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  focused	  on	  the	  destruction	  that	  occurred	  in	  urban	  areas.	  A	  total	  of	  sixty-­‐six	  of	  Japan’s	  cities	  were	  bombed,	  and	  on	  average	  each	  city	  saw	  around	  40%	  of	  its	  structures	  destroyed.	  Nearly	  6,000,000	  families	  homes	  were	  felled	  alongside	  Japan’s	  hospitals	  and	  public	  buildings.89	  	  	  Japan’s	  newly	  homeless	  population	  had	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  live	  amongst	  the	  ashes	  of	  their	  destroyed	  homes.	  While	  some	  moved	  into	  train	  stations,	  many	  more	  constructed	  makeshift	  shelters	  out	  of	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  rubble	  piles	  that	  clogged	  their	  cities.	  Shantytowns	  appeared	  amidst	  the	  remains	  of	  fire-­‐bombed	  neighborhoods,	  and	  remained	  there	  for	  years.	  As	  with	  housing,	  sanitation	  in	  Japan	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was	  deleteriously	  affected	  by	  the	  frequent	  fire-­‐bombing	  of	  Japanese	  cities.	  	  Aside	  from	  creating	  large	  rubbles	  piles,	  Allied	  fire-­‐bombing	  also	  destroyed	  cities’	  sewage	  and	  drainage	  systems,	  which	  were	  integral	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  sanitary	  conditions	  in	  large	  cities	  like	  Tokyo	  and	  Osaka.	  Within	  Japan’s	  destroyed	  neighborhoods,	  disease	  spread	  quickly.	  Rats,	  flies,	  and	  lice	  infested	  homes	  and	  spread	  diseases	  like	  typhus	  and	  typhoid.	  The	  standing	  water	  created	  by	  the	  destruction	  of	  sewage	  systems	  provided	  fertile	  breeding	  grounds	  for	  mosquitos,	  which	  spread	  Japanese	  Ecehpalitis	  B	  to	  their	  human	  hosts.90	  The	  presence	  of	  sewage	  backflow	  also	  incited	  a	  sky-­‐rocketing	  in	  the	  rates	  of	  enteric	  diseases	  like	  dysentery,	  which	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  accidental	  ingestion	  of	  bacteria-­‐infected	  human	  fecal	  matter.	  Enteric	  disease	  became	  so	  prevalent	  within	  Japan’s	  shantytowns	  that	  they	  were	  secondary	  only	  to	  tuberculosis	  in	  mortality	  rates.91	  Like	  the	  wildfire	  diseases,	  tuberculosis	  also	  thrived	  in	  Japan’s	  shantytowns.	  Families	  were	  pushed	  into	  smaller	  living	  spaces	  than	  they	  had	  been	  in	  the	  prewar	  period,	  and	  tuberculosis	  spread	  quickly	  from	  person	  to	  person.	  Families	  in	  these	  homes	  had	  little	  access	  to	  nutritious	  food.	  Likewise,	  fuel	  and	  clothing	  were	  in	  short	  supply	  during	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  occupation.	  The	  shantytown’s	  hastily	  constructed	  homes	  provided	  little	  shelter	  from	  either	  summer	  heat	  and	  freezing	  winter	  conditions.	  Tuberculosis	  easily	  overcame	  the	  immune	  systems	  of	  people	  living	  in	  such	  conditions.	  Thus,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  PH&W	  system	  could	  not	  afford	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  encephalitis	  is	  a	  viral	  disease	  that	  causes	  inflammation	  in	  the	  brain	  and	  spinal	  chord.	  	  91	  Crawford	  F.	  Sams	  “American	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  Health	  Administration	  Meets	  the	  Problems	  of	  Orient	  in	  Japan”	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the	  resources	  to	  deal	  directly	  with	  tuberculosis,	  the	  population’s	  defenses	  against	  the	  disease	  were	  down	  as	  well.	  	  	  When	  Sams	  and	  the	  PH&W	  section	  surveyed	  living	  conditions	  within	  Japan	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  conclusions	  they	  reached	  were	  both	  expected	  and	  ironic.	  The	  PH&W’s	  reactions	  were	  expected	  in	  that	  the	  impression	  they	  took	  from	  Japan’s	  immediate	  postwar	  conditions	  were	  enough	  to	  convince	  them	  that	  Japan	  had	  always	  been	  severely	  backwards	  in	  matters	  concerning	  sanitation.	  The	  1948	  edition	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section’s	  annual	  report,	  which	  was	  the	  first	  such	  report	  published	  and	  therefore	  included	  background	  information	  on	  every	  topic	  concerning	  the	  section’s	  activities.	  Nonetheless,	  1948	  report	  largely	  overlooked	  the	  existing	  sanitation	  system,	  including	  	  sewage	  systems	  of	  the	  country’s	  cities	  which	  had	  been	  largely	  destroyed	  in	  the	  bombing	  raids	  of	  1944	  and	  1945.	  Similarly,	  the	  report	  discounted	  the	  work	  of	  Japan’s	  neighborhood	  sanitation	  groups	  during	  the	  war	  years.	  These	  groups,	  called	  eisei	  kumai,	  were	  comprised	  of	  citizens	  who	  worked	  in	  tandem	  with	  their	  local	  police	  station	  to	  aid	  the	  government	  in	  maintaining	  sanitation	  standards.	  The	  PH&W’s	  explains	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  the	  country	  only	  had	  two	  sanitation	  engineers,	  both	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  trained	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe.	  While	  this	  was	  likely	  far	  from	  true,	  this	  statement	  suggested	  that	  the	  Japanese	  had	  no	  legitimate	  way	  to	  enforce	  health	  standards.92	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  report	  concluded	  that	  that	  Japanese	  sanitation	  practices	  were	  “medieval”	  and	  comprised	  of	  customs	  and	  attitudes	  that	  “had	  not	  changed	  in	  centuries.”93	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For	  his	  part,	  Sams	  believed	  that	  the	  abundance	  of	  pests	  running	  freely	  through	  Japan’s	  shantytowns	  offered	  sufficient	  evidence	  that,	  unlike	  American	  citizens,	  the	  Japanese	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  value	  of	  pest	  control,	  and	  had	  never	  undertaken	  the	  task	  of	  eradicating	  pests	  from	  their	  homes.94	  He	  similarly	  dismissed	  prewar	  sanitation	  in	  Japan	  in	  his	  article	  “American	  Public	  Health	  Administration	  Meets	  the	  Problems	  of	  Orient	  in	  Japan,”	  where	  he	  wrote	  off	  the	  biannual,	  	  eisei	  kumai	  orchestrated	  cleaning	  campaigns	  as	  little	  more	  than	  “spring	  cleanings.”95	  The	  PHW	  section’s	  conclusions	  about	  Japanese	  sanitation	  practices	  are	  ironic	  in	  that	  they	  mirror	  conclusion	  drawn	  by	  the	  Japanese	  about	  sanitation	  within	  their	  past	  imperial	  holdings.	  In	  a	  1910	  report	  on	  conditions	  in	  Korea,	  the	  Japanese	  colonial	  authorities	  depicted	  Korea’s	  sanitation	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  PH&W	  section	  would	  depict	  Japan’s	  own	  sanitation	  conditions	  thirty	  years	  later.	  The	  Japanese	  report	  states	  that	  sanitation	  is	  severely	  lacking	  in	  Korea,	  as	  the	  Koreans	  have	  to	  “be	  at	  a	  standstill	  for	  a	  long	  time”	  and	  have	  refused	  to	  incorporate	  modern	  sanitation	  techniques.96	  It	  goes	  on	  to	  recount	  that	  no	  form	  of	  waste	  management	  exist	  within	  Korea.	  The	  streets	  are	  littered	  with	  refuse,	  and	  the	  soil	  and	  water	  throughout	  Korea	  is	  polluted.	  Near	  the	  end,	  the	  report	  mentions	  that	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  control	  waste-­‐borne	  diseases	  through	  vaccination	  campaigns,	  and	  that	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sewage	  systems	  and	  water	  treatment	  plants	  are	  being	  built	  in	  large	  cities	  like	  Seoul.	  Furthermore,	  it	  lauds	  the	  efforts	  of	  Japanese	  sanitation	  engineers	  to	  establish	  the	  Seoul	  Sanitary	  Association.	  Through	  this	  group,	  Japanese	  colonial	  authorities	  hoped	  to	  train	  Korean	  medical	  leaders	  to	  improve	  the	  colony’s	  sanitation.97	  The	  1910	  Japanese	  progress	  report	  about	  colonial	  Korea	  is	  illuminating	  for	  several	  reasons.	  It	  demonstrates	  that	  like	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  Japanese	  colonizers	  tended	  to	  deride	  living	  conditions	  within	  their	  colonial	  holdings.	  Both	  the	  PH&W	  and	  the	  Japanese	  point	  out	  issues	  with	  filth,	  waste	  management,	  water	  treatment,	  and	  environmentally-­‐linked	  diseases.	  	  The	  documents	  also	  reveal	  that	  like	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  Japanese	  colonial	  authorities	  were	  aware	  of	  solution	  to	  these	  issues.	  Within	  Korea,	  the	  Japanese	  colonial	  government	  went	  on	  to	  enacted	  waste	  management	  programs,	  built	  water	  treatment	  plants,	  and	  tested	  and	  vaccinated	  against	  diseases.98	  The	  actions	  that	  the	  PH&W	  section	  undertook	  to	  restore	  sanitation	  control	  in	  Japan	  more	  closely	  resembled	  a	  return	  to	  prewar	  practices	  than	  the	  incorporation	  of	  new	  sanitation	  techniques	  into	  Japan.	  While	  Japan	  very	  likely	  had	  more	  than	  two	  sanitation	  engineers	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  war,	  sanitation	  engineering	  had	  been	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  Japan’s	  imperial	  expansion.	  	  The	  PH&W	  section	  saw	  sanitation	  workers	  as	  the	  frontline	  between	  people	  and	  disease.	  As	  such,	  its	  first	  priority	  was	  to	  establish	  sanitation	  teams,	  which	  in	  turn	  carries	  out	  various	  directives	  aimed	  at	  eradicating	  diseases	  and	  cleansing	  urban	  environments.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  in	  late	  1945	  the	  PH&W	  section	  ordered	  the	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  Regency	  General,	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  Japan	  Regency	  General,	  “Recent	  Progress	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Home	  Ministry	  to	  establish	  six-­‐man	  teams	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  immediate	  response	  to	  Japan’s	  lack	  of	  sanitation	  workers.99	  These	  teams	  were	  set	  to	  work	  clearing	  rubble,	  repairing	  water	  supply	  systems,	  and	  making	  other	  repairs	  to	  the	  existing	  sanitation	  system.	  As	  these	  projects	  progressed,	  these	  initial	  teams	  also	  participated	  in	  typhus	  control	  through	  the	  spraying	  of	  DDT.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1946,	  over	  9,000	  sanitary	  teams	  were	  engaged	  in	  cleaning	  up	  Japan’s	  cities	  and	  controlling	  the	  rodent	  and	  insect	  populations.	  By	  the	  summer	  of	  1947,	  60,000	  teams	  had	  been	  established	  throughout	  the	  country.100	  Sanitation	  teams	  were	  gradually	  reduced	  as	  the	  occupation	  continued,	  and	  pest-­‐borne	  diseases	  were	  brought	  under	  control.	  In	  1946	  Japan	  had	  one	  six-­‐man	  sanitation	  team	  for	  every	  2,000	  citizens.	  In	  1949,	  that	  ratio	  dropped	  to	  one	  team	  per	  every	  15,000	  Japanese.101	  During	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  occupation,	  sanitary	  teams	  succeeded	  through	  water	  treatment	  and	  pest	  eradication	  campaigns	  in	  halting	  the	  spread	  of	  these	  so-­‐called	  wildfire	  diseases.	  For	  example,	  typhus,	  a	  louse-­‐borne	  disease,	  peaked	  annually	  in	  the	  spring.	  The	  work	  of	  sanitation	  teams	  ensured	  that	  typhus	  morbidity	  rates	  dropped	  from	  nearly	  150	  cases	  per	  100,000	  Japanese	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1947	  to	  under	  four	  cases	  per	  100,000	  in	  1948.102	  Typhoid,	  dysentery,	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Encephalitis	  B,	  and	  many	  other	  diseases	  prevalent	  in	  the	  early	  occupation	  period	  also	  underwent	  a	  drastic	  decrease.	  Like	  the	  changes	  made	  to	  Japan’s	  hospital	  systems,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  sanitary	  teams	  would	  also	  be	  valuable	  to	  the	  later	  attack	  on	  tuberculosis.	  In	  addition	  to	  sanitary	  teams	  carting	  away	  refuse	  to	  open	  up	  areas	  for	  homes	  to	  be	  rebuilt,	  they	  also	  reestablished	  access	  to	  clean	  water.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  sanitation	  teams	  constituted	  the	  first	  large	  public	  health	  project	  undertaken	  by	  the	  PH&W	  and	  Japanese	  workers.	  While	  the	  PH&W	  section	  again	  chose	  only	  to	  orchestrate	  the	  formation	  of	  sanitation	  teams,	  and	  occasionally	  provide	  supplies,	  the	  various	  projects	  completed	  demonstrated	  that	  large	  public	  health	  campaigns	  could	  be	  successful.	  Many	  sanitation	  team	  projects,	  such	  as	  the	  widespread	  spraying	  of	  citizens	  with	  DDT	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  typhus,	  would	  be	  reflected	  in	  future	  tuberculosis	  screening	  and	  vaccination	  campaigns.	  	  While	  tuberculosis	  control	  was	  not	  an	  immediate	  concern	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section	  during	  the	  early	  occupation	  years,	  later	  control	  did	  benefit	  from	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  Japanese	  medical	  professionals,	  and	  sanitation	  teams	  in	  the	  early	  occupation	  period.	  The	  changes	  made	  to	  Japan’s	  medical	  system	  ensured	  that	  when	  the	  PH&W	  section	  was	  ready	  to	  tackle	  tuberculosis,	  hospitals	  and	  sanatoria	  were	  better	  stocked	  and	  staffed.	  Sanitation	  teams	  not	  only	  eradicated	  early	  diseases	  that	  prevented	  the	  PH&W	  section	  from	  turning	  its	  attention	  to	  the	  less	  swiftly	  cured	  tuberculosis,	  but	  also	  helped	  restore	  sanitation	  to	  Japan’s	  communities,	  and	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  rebuilding.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  early	  occupation	  period,	  the	  foundation	  was	  laid	  for	  the	  PH&W’s	  campaign	  against	  tuberculosis.	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CHAPTER	  4	  
THE	  FINAL	  ROUND:	  MANAGING	  TUBERCULOSIS	  IN	  
THE	  OCCUPATION	  PERIOD	  	  	  While	  the	  Public	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (PH&W)	  section	  spent	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  occupation	  improving	  both	  the	  Japanese	  medical	  system	  and	  living	  conditions	  in	  Japan,	  the	  specter	  of	  tuberculosis	  loomed	  large	  in	  the	  background.	  In	  the	  chaos	  that	  engulfed	  the	  first	  few	  months	  after	  Japan’s	  surrender,	  tuberculosis	  rates	  rose	  with	  unprecedented	  speed.	  In	  1943,	  the	  last	  pre-­‐occupation	  year	  for	  which	  statics	  were	  collected,	  tuberculosis	  was	  reported	  to	  have	  mortality	  rate	  of	  225	  per	  100,000	  people.	  By	  1945,	  that	  rate	  had	  risen	  to	  over	  280	  per	  100,000.	  That	  year,	  tuberculosis	  accounted	  for	  nearly	  15%	  of	  the	  total	  deaths	  in	  Japan.103	  	  General	  Crawford	  F.	  	  Sams	  rather	  dramatically	  remarked	  that	  the	  number	  of	  civilian	  deaths	  from	  tuberculosis	  in	  1945	  outweighed	  the	  deaths	  caused	  by	  Allied	  fire-­‐bombing,	  the	  two	  atomic	  bombs,	  and	  fire	  raids	  combined.104	  Whether	  or	  not	  his	  statement	  was	  accurate,	  tuberculosis	  claimed	  the	  lives	  of	  tens	  of	  	  thousands	  of	  Japanese	  citizens	  during	  the	  war,	  and	  continued	  to	  pose	  a	  threat	  as	  the	  country	  began	  to	  rebuild	  following	  the	  war.	  	   The	  PH&W	  section	  immediately	  identified	  tuberculosis	  as	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  health	  crises	  facing	  Japan.	  Combatting	  tuberculosis	  would	  require	  large	  advances	  to	  be	  made	  in	  regards	  to	  public	  education,	  preventative	  practices,	  and	  inpatient	  treatment.	  As	  such,	  tuberculosis	  would	  require	  General	  Sams	  and	  the	  PH&W	  sections	  to	  “push	  all	  the	  wheels”	  once,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  even	  more	  strenuously	  than	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  GHQ. Public Health and Welfare in Japan: Annual Summary 1948,	  38.	  	  104	  Sams,	  Medic,	  109.	  	  
	   58	  
had	  when	  tackling	  Japan’s	  medical	  system	  reforms.	  While	  many	  of	  the	  wheels	  that	  the	  PH&W	  section	  pushed,	  including	  inoculation	  campaigns,	  medical	  treatments,	  and	  construction	  of	  new	  sanatorium	  buildings,	  had	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  mid-­‐occupation	  period,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  began	  planning	  their	  campaign	  against	  tuberculosis	  from	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  occupation.	  The	  first	  step	  in	  overcoming	  Japan’s	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  involved	  careful	  data	  gathering.	  The	  same	  early	  directives	  that	  required	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  to	  turn	  over	  statics	  concerning	  Japan’s	  hospitals	  also	  required	  them	  to	  send	  information	  on	  tuberculosis.	  As	  tuberculosis	  had	  been	  designated	  one	  of	  Japan’s	  “national	  diseases”	  in	  1918,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  expected	  to	  find	  several	  decades	  worth	  of	  records	  for	  the	  disease.105	  When	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  sent	  over	  their	  records	  on	  tuberculosis,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  quickly	  realized	  that	  spotty	  tuberculosis	  reporting	  in	  the	  past	  meant	  that	  new	  records	  needed	  to	  be	  taken.106	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  exact	  magnitude	  of	  Japan’s	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  the	  PH&W	  section	  re-­‐mandated	  tuberculosis	  reporting.	  New	  tuberculosis	  statistics	  were	  collected	  from	  hospitals	  and	  physicians,	  but	  this	  time	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  of	  the	  Allied	  Powers	  (SCAP)	  statistics	  bureau,	  not	  the	  Home	  Ministry,	  undertook	  the	  initial	  surveying.	  Only	  after	  SCAP	  completed	  their	  initial	  statistical	  surveys	  was	  the	  job	  of	  maintaining	  up	  to	  date	  statistics	  turned	  over	  to	  the	  Home	  Ministry.	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  tuberculosis	  statistics	  continued	  to	  be	  reported,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  mandated	  monthly	  reporting	  by	  physicians	  within	  public	  hospitals,	  sanatoria,	  and	  public	  health	  centers.	  These	  physicians	  worked	  closely	  with	  personnel	  from	  SCAP’s	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statistic	  bureau,	  who	  helped	  train	  the	  physicians	  in	  proper	  reporting	  and	  ensured	  that	  monthly	  reports	  were	  gathered.107	  The	  methods	  involved	  in	  gathering	  tuberculosis	  statistics	  during	  the	  occupation	  did	  not	  vary	  greatly	  from	  those	  used	  in	  the	  years	  before.	  However,	  statistics	  reporting	  was	  more	  successful	  than	  prewar	  and	  wartime	  statistics	  reporting	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  SCAP	  had	  more	  personnel	  that	  could	  be	  devoted	  to	  gathering	  statistics.	  Members	  of	  the	  SCAP	  statistics	  bureau	  had	  been	  highly	  trained	  in	  data	  management	  and	  survey	  taking	  and	  their	  attention	  was	  not	  divided	  amongst	  other	  tasks.	  	  As	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  War	  progressed,	  for	  example,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  shifted	  the	  labor	  of	  able-­‐bodied	  males	  and	  trained	  physicians	  away	  from	  conducting	  surveys	  and	  gathering	  statistics	  to	  directly	  assist	  in	  the	  war	  effort.	  As	  the	  occupation	  continued,	  SCAP	  statisticians	  were	  also	  able	  to	  train	  Japanese	  government	  employees	  and	  transfer	  the	  work	  of	  planning	  and	  executing	  surveys	  and	  gathering	  statistics	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (MHW).	  By	  1951,	  the	  PH&W	  had	  trained	  over	  500	  MHW	  employees	  in	  statistical	  work,	  and	  had	  helped	  the	  MHW	  found	  their	  own	  Statistics	  and	  Research	  Division.108	  Because	  the	  PH&W	  section	  involved	  itself	  more	  closely	  in	  the	  process	  of	  statistics	  gathering	  through	  working	  with	  the	  MHW	  to	  create	  a	  strong	  force	  of	  statisticians,	  government	  institutions	  in	  Japan	  more	  closely	  regulated	  tuberculosis	  statistics	  than	  they	  had	  in	  the	  past.	  This	  attention	  led	  correspondingly	  to	  more	  accurate	  reporting.	  	  Lastly,	  although	  tuberculosis	  reporting	  took	  essentially	  the	  same	  form	  as	  it	  had	  before	  the	  war,	  tuberculosis	  reporting	  succeeded	  in	  the	  occupation	  period	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because	  it	  was	  coupled	  with	  large	  public	  education	  campaigns.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  stigma	  that	  surrounded	  tuberculosis.	  Changes	  made	  to	  Japan’s	  medical	  education	  system	  helped	  ensured	  that	  Japanese	  physicians	  were	  focused	  on	  providing	  quality	  care,	  not	  on	  selling	  palliatives.	  Thus,	  physicians	  lost	  their	  incentive	  to	  hide	  tuberculosis	  cases.	  These	  changes	  did	  little,	  however,	  to	  change	  the	  public	  sentiment	  surrounding	  tuberculosis	  that	  kept	  patients	  with	  tuberculosis	  coming	  forward	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  These	  changes	  would	  come	  only	  later	  through	  public	  awareness	  campaigns	  about	  tuberculosis.	  	  As	  with	  the	  reinstitution	  of	  tuberculosis	  reporting,	  the	  information	  disseminated	  to	  the	  public	  in	  order	  to	  dispel	  tuberculosis’s	  stigma	  during	  the	  occupation	  period	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  information	  distributed	  during	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period.	  The	  means	  of	  distribution,	  however,	  varied	  greatly.	  While	  in	  the	  prewar	  period	  the	  Japanese	  government	  had	  been	  eager	  to	  convince	  the	  public	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  a	  medical	  disease,	  not	  a	  hereditary	  affliction,	  most	  of	  the	  information	  that	  reached	  the	  Japanese	  public	  about	  tuberculosis	  and	  its	  prevention	  came	  from	  more	  unofficial	  sources.	  Although	  the	  government	  and	  medical	  community	  embraced	  prevention	  as	  a	  means	  to	  combat	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  they	  did	  not	  sponsor	  public	  education	  campaigns	  in	  order	  to	  teach	  prevention	  to	  the	  public.	  Information	  about	  sanitation	  and	  preventative	  techniques	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  combat	  tuberculosis	  reached	  most	  Japanese	  through	  the	  work	  of	  small	  neighborhood	  groups,	  called	  eisei	  kumai.109	  	  While	  these	  neighborhood	  groups	  disseminated	  information	  about	  sanitation,	  the	  hygienic	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practices	  they	  taught	  were	  not	  necessarily	  linked	  to	  tuberculosis	  prevention.	  Furthermore,	  these	  groups	  were	  comprised	  primarily	  of	  ordinary	  community	  members,	  not	  medical	  professionals	  or	  government	  officials.	  As	  such,	  their	  reach	  and	  influence	  was	  limited.	  	  The	  Japanese	  government	  and	  medical	  community	  may	  not	  have	  sponsored	  widespread	  tuberculosis	  education	  campaigns	  during	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  but	  groups	  within	  the	  United	  States	  did.	  Books	  aimed	  at	  explaining	  tuberculosis	  to	  the	  public	  appeared	  as	  early	  as	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  became	  increasingly	  numerous	  as	  rates	  of	  the	  disease	  rose	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.110	  For	  example,	  in	  1923	  the	  Colorado	  Foundation	  for	  Research	  in	  Tuberculosis	  published	  an	  educational	  booklet	  entitled	  Overcoming	  Tuberculosis:	  An	  Almanac	  of	  Recovery.	  Using	  this	  book,	  a	  tuberculosis	  patient	  and	  their	  family	  could	  learn	  about	  the	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  about	  how	  to	  overcome	  tuberculosis,	  which	  at	  the	  time	  consisted	  of	  bed	  rest,	  ample	  nutrition,	  and	  the	  avoidance	  of	  strenuous	  mental	  work,	  and	  also	  track	  the	  progress	  of	  their	  recovery.111	  By	  the	  1940s	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  literature	  aimed	  at	  tuberculosis	  education	  had	  spread	  beyond	  the	  tuberculosis	  patient	  to	  target	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  One	  particularly	  interesting	  example	  of	  tuberculosis	  education	  literature,	  Huber	  the	  
Tuber	  (1940)	  by	  Dr.	  Harry	  A.	  Wilmer,	  educated	  American	  citizens	  about	  tuberculosis	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  While	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  rates	  peaked	  in	  1945	  in	  Japan,	  morbidity	  rates	  in	  the	  United	  States	  hit	  their	  highest	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1915	  and	  1920.	  From	  1920	  onward,	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  rates	  in	  the	  United	  States	  declined	  slowly	  due	  to	  increased	  availability	  of	  care,	  and	  public	  awareness	  concerning	  tuberculosis	  prevention.	  Flurin	  Condrau	  and	  Worboys,	  Micheal	  eds.,	  Tuberculosis	  then	  
and	  Now:	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Tuberculosis	  (Quebec:	  McGill-­‐Queen’s	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  35.	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by	  anthropomorphizing	  various	  tuberculosis	  bacterium	  and	  casting	  them	  as	  key	  figures	  at	  a	  time	  of	  rising	  international	  tensions.	  While	  Huber	  the	  Tuber	  himself	  was	  represented	  as	  a	  generic	  tubercule	  bacillis,	  he	  was	  joined	  by	  Nasty	  von	  Sputum	  and	  Tojotuber,	  both	  of	  whom	  represented	  more	  virulent	  forms	  of	  the	  disease.	  Within	  
Huber	  the	  Tuber,	  Nasty,	  a	  thinly	  veiled	  Hitler	  figure,	  held	  rallies	  and	  ordered	  his	  bacterium	  armies	  to	  prepare	  for	  battle.	  	  Later	  in	  the	  book,	  Tojotuber,	  a	  figure	  modeled	  on	  the	  Japanese	  premier	  Tōjō	  Hideki,	  mimicked	  his	  namesake	  and	  attacked	  a	  group	  of	  antibodies	  with	  his	  tuberculosis	  troops.	  Each	  illustration	  in	  Huber	  the	  
Tuber	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  page	  describing	  the	  stage	  of	  tuberculosis	  depicted	  in	  the	  illustration	  and	  explaining	  the	  most	  up	  to	  date	  procedures	  and	  treatments.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  reader	  watched	  Huber,	  who	  himself	  represents	  tuberculosis	  in	  its	  relatively	  harmless	  latent	  stage,	  try	  to	  convince	  Nasty	  and	  Tojotuber	  to	  live	  peacefully	  within	  the	  body,	  they	  also	  learned	  about	  tuberculosis	  testing,	  lung	  surgeries	  that	  alleviate	  tuberculosis	  symptoms,	  and	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  avoid	  infection.112	  	  
Huber	  the	  Tuber	  linked	  tuberculosis	  with	  the	  current	  political	  tensions	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  Japanese	  imperial	  government	  hoped	  to	  link	  tuberculosis	  to	  their	  	  war	  efforts.	  In	  both	  countries,	  tuberculosis	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  army	  and	  workforce.	  American	  and	  Japanese	  governments	  both	  believed	  their	  citizens	  needed	  to	  keep	  their	  bodies	  free	  of	  tuberculosis	  for	  the	  good	  of	  their	  country.	  The	  most	  important	  difference	  between	  Japan’s	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  approach	  to	  tuberculosis	  control	  at	  this	  time	  came	  in	  how	  the	  disease	  was	  presented	  to	  the	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public.	  While	  Wilmer’s	  book	  was	  not	  commissioned	  by	  the	  United	  States	  government,	  Huber	  the	  Tuber’s	  depiction	  of	  tuberculosis	  as	  a	  battle,	  and	  his	  use	  of	  easily	  recognizable	  enemies	  meshed	  well	  with	  the	  government’s	  own	  agendas.	  Wilmer’s	  use	  of	  cartoon	  characters	  and	  inclusion	  of	  detailed	  medical	  information	  made	  his	  book	  both	  easily	  accessible	  to	  young	  Americans	  and	  useful	  for	  older	  readers.	  The	  Japanese	  government’s	  approach	  to	  tuberculosis	  control	  relied	  more	  on	  mandatory	  testing	  than	  on	  public	  persuasion.	  As	  such,	  between	  1940	  and	  1945,	  when	  tuberculosis	  testing	  became	  mandatory	  for	  all	  males	  aged	  fifteen	  to	  thirty,	  inoculations	  were	  given,	  but	  public	  attitudes	  towards	  tuberculosis	  and	  its	  causes	  were	  not	  encouraged	  to	  change.	  Moreover,	  preventative	  measures	  like	  those	  that	  Wilmer	  encouraged	  in	  Huber	  the	  Tuber	  were	  not	  openly	  discussed	  amongst	  the	  Japanese	  public.	  Society	  remained	  able	  to	  avoid	  topic	  of	  tuberculosis,	  so	  long	  as	  men	  showed	  up	  for	  their	  annual	  screenings.	  	  Society’s	  ability	  to	  ignore	  tuberculosis	  changed	  during	  the	  occupation	  period,	  when	  the	  PH&W	  and	  MHW	  pushed	  the	  disease	  into	  the	  spotlight.	  Because	  public	  acknowledgement	  and	  reportage	  of	  tuberculosis	  became	  crucial	  to	  managing	  the	  disease,	  it	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  ignored.	  	  From	  1946,	  PH&W	  section	  and	  MHW	  sponsored	  public	  health	  campaigns	  	  attacked	  the	  idea	  of	  tuberculosis	  as	  hereditary	  and	  presented	  the	  latest	  medical	  facts	  concerning	  how	  and	  why	  tuberculosis	  spreads.	  Public	  service	  notices	  explaining	  that	  tuberculosis	  was	  a	  bacterial	  disease	  and	  not	  hereditary	  ran	  on	  the	  radio,	  in	  newspapers,	  magazines,	  and	  journals,	  and	  were	  posted	  throughout	  Japan’s	  shopping	  and	  business	  districts.113	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The	  Five-­‐Front	  Attack	  on	  Tuberculosis:	  
Centers	  and	  Staff	  	  By	  October	  1946,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  had	  announced	  a	  fully	  developed	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  attack	  on	  tuberculosis.	  The	  PH&W	  section,	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  MHW	  combated	  tuberculosis	  on	  five	  fronts,	  which	  were	  heavily	  interrelated	  and	  dependent	  on	  earlier	  occupation	  programs.	  First,	  every	  effort	  would	  be	  made	  to	  ensure	  that	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  came	  forward,	  and	  sought	  treatment	  in	  Japan’s	  hospitals	  and	  sanatoria.	  This	  first	  front	  relied	  heavily	  on	  both	  the	  work	  done	  to	  rehabilitate	  Japan’s	  hospitals	  systems,	  and	  on	  the	  public	  campaigns	  against	  tuberculosis	  started	  during	  the	  surveying	  process.	  The	  second	  front	  placed	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  physician	  and	  nursing	  training.	  Again,	  early	  occupation	  efforts	  to	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	  medical	  education	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  achieving	  this	  goal.	  The	  third	  front	  of	  the	  PH&W	  sections	  attack	  against	  tuberculosis	  involved	  protecting	  Japan’s	  youngest	  citizens	  from	  tuberculosis	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  school	  lunch	  program.	  Finally,	  while	  the	  fourth	  front	  consisted	  of	  careful	  screenings	  of	  Japan’s	  youth	  for	  tuberculosis,	  the	  fifth	  extended	  these	  screenings	  to	  the	  entire	  population.114	  When	  the	  PH&W	  section	  announced	  its	  plan	  of	  attack	  on	  tuberculosis	  in	  1946,	  the	  goals	  of	  returning	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  to	  sanatoria	  and	  of	  staffing	  tuberculosis	  treatment	  centers	  were	  the	  most	  readily	  achievable.	  The	  efforts	  made	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to	  encourage	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  to	  self-­‐report	  for	  statistical	  purposes	  overlapped	  with	  the	  effort	  to	  incite	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  to	  seek	  aid.	  While	  informational	  advertisements	  concerning	  tuberculosis	  were	  represented	  in	  all	  available	  forms	  of	  media,	  newspapers	  were	  particularly	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  task	  of	  pointing	  tuberculosis	  patients	  towards	  help.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  earliest	  public	  service	  notices	  in	  newspapers	  concerning	  tuberculosis	  publicized	  not	  only	  the	  existence	  of	  treatment	  centers	  for	  tuberculosis	  patients,	  but	  also	  the	  existence	  of	  institutions	  offering	  guidance	  and	  counsel.	  For	  example,	  on	  March	  27,	  1946,	  a	  short	  article	  in	  the	  Yomiuri	  Shimbun	  announced	  the	  opening	  of	  Keiō	  University’s	  tuberculosis	  advising	  office.115	  	  Other	  entries	  informed	  the	  public	  of	  local	  government	  health	  offices,	  such	  as	  the	  “AO”	  office	  in	  Arima,	  a	  small	  town	  near	  Kobe,	  where	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  seek	  advice	  and	  receive	  care.	  
116	   Advising	  offices,	  like	  the	  one	  managed	  by	  Keiō	  University,	  were	  established	  throughout	  the	  occupation	  period,	  but	  also	  had	  prewar	  precedents,	  a	  fact	  which	  the	  PH&W	  section	  and	  Sams	  often	  overlooked	  in	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  health	  center	  system	  that	  was	  developed	  during	  the	  occupation.	  The	  Home	  Ministry	  opened	  the	  first	  prewar	  national	  health	  center	  opened	  in	  1937	  and	  had	  established	  fifty	  similar	  centers	  within	  Japan	  by	  1938.	  The	  centers	  were	  expected	  to	  aid	  in	  public	  education,	  tuberculosis	  treatment,	  and	  provide	  support	  for	  mothers	  and	  children.	  However,	  because	  the	  establishment	  of	  health	  centers	  coincided	  with	  	  the	  outset	  of	  war	  in	  China,	  these	  centers	  were	  provided	  with	  little	  funding	  from	  the	  national	  government	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  1946,	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and	  also	  suffered	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  supplies	  and	  properly	  trained	  personnel	  .117	  Thus,	  the	  ability	  of	  prewar	  national	  health	  centers	  to	  promote	  health	  was	  severely	  hampered.	  Furthermore,	  as	  with	  sanatoria,	  those	  suspecting	  they	  had	  tuberculosis	  avoided	  the	  prewar	  health	  centers	  for	  fear	  of	  being	  reported	  and	  ostracized.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  most	  national	  health	  centers	  had	  already	  closed.	  While	  those	  that	  remained	  open	  offered	  consultations	  to	  visitors,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  provide	  aid	  in	  the	  form	  of	  medicine	  and	  medical	  treatment.118	  	   As	  part	  of	  the	  push	  to	  educate	  the	  Japanese	  public	  about	  tuberculosis,	  PH&W	  section	  reopened	  former	  health	  centers	  and	  built	  new	  centers.	  	  These	  new	  health	  centers	  were	  given	  expanded	  responsibilities,	  which	  included	  not	  only	  tuberculosis	  counseling,	  but	  also	  providing	  health	  education,	  monitoring	  environmental	  sanitation,	  statics	  work,	  and	  examination	  services.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  classified	  these	  health	  centers	  into	  three	  classes.	  Class	  A	  health	  centers	  were	  the	  largest,	  with	  a	  staff	  of	  sixty-­‐one,	  and	  thus	  offered	  the	  most	  complete	  range	  of	  services.	  These	  centers,	  which	  were	  primarily	  found	  in	  large	  urban	  centers,	  employed	  at	  least	  eight	  physicians,	  fifteen	  public	  health	  nurses,	  and	  even	  five	  sanitarians.	  Class	  B	  centers,	  which	  have	  a	  staff	  of	  at	  least	  fifty-­‐four,	  housed	  the	  same	  number	  of	  doctors,	  but	  only	  eight	  nurses.	  Finally,	  Class	  C	  centers,	  which	  served	  smaller	  communities,	  functioned	  with	  a	  staff	  of	  thirty-­‐five.	  In	  favor	  of	  employing	  sufficient	  nurses	  and	  physicians	  to	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treat	  their	  visitors,	  these	  health	  centers	  omitted	  extra	  services	  such	  as	  veterinary	  and	  dental	  care.119	  	  	   While	  the	  new	  national	  health	  centers	  offered	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  services	  to	  the	  community,	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  remained	  one	  of	  their	  primary	  functions.	  Out	  of	  the	  sixty-­‐one	  staff	  members	  working	  in	  a	  Class	  A	  facility,	  four	  staff	  members	  were	  devoted	  specifically	  to	  tuberculosis	  services.	  Two	  out	  of	  the	  facilities	  eight	  doctors	  worked	  exclusively	  with	  tuberculosis.	  As	  x-­‐ray	  film	  became	  available	  in	  the	  later	  years	  of	  the	  occupation,	  each	  center	  employed	  its	  own	  technician	  solely	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  tuberculosis	  screening.	  The	  final	  fulltime	  staff	  member	  devoted	  to	  tuberculosis	  was	  a	  non-­‐professional	  staff	  member	  who	  preformed	  administrative	  work.120	  MHW	  records	  also	  show	  that	  tuberculosis	  related	  procedures	  comprised	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  all	  procedures	  performed.	  In	  the	  years	  from	  1949	  to	  1952,	  tuberculosis	  health	  consultations	  accounted	  for	  more	  consultations	  than	  all	  other	  types	  combined.	  Likewise,	  more	  public	  nurses	  visited	  tuberculosis	  patients	  than	  patients	  with	  any	  other	  disease	  or	  health	  problem,	  and	  each	  year	  the	  public	  health	  centers	  completed	  more	  tuberculosis	  examinations	  than	  all	  other	  types	  of	  offered	  examinations	  combined.121	  In	  1947,	  the	  Japanese	  MHW	  revised	  the	  “Health	  Center	  Law”	  that	  had	  established	  the	  national	  health	  center	  system	  in	  1937.	  The	  revision	  redefined	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  national	  health	  centers	  to	  include	  the	  health	  services	  listed	  above.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  law	  finally	  granted	  health	  center	  authority	  within	  the	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government	  with	  regards	  to	  these	  tasks.	  In	  formalizing	  both	  the	  new	  goals	  for	  health	  centers	  and	  in	  granting	  them	  greater	  authority,	  national	  health	  centers	  changed	  from	  the	  toothless	  institutions	  of	  the	  prewar	  period	  to	  institutions	  government	  representation	  and	  with	  resources	  that	  actually	  reached	  the	  communities	  they	  served.	  By	  1947,	  there	  were	  also	  over	  657	  national	  health	  centers,	  which	  together	  employed	  over	  2,500	  physicians	  and	  4,200	  nurses.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  occupation,	  the	  MHW	  had	  established	  724	  centers,	  which	  employed	  over	  4,700	  physicians	  and	  7,300	  nurses.	  	  Like	  Japan’s	  newly	  instituted	  public	  hospital	  system,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  national	  health	  centers	  owed	  much	  to	  changes	  made	  in	  medical	  education.	  By	  1947,	  the	  first	  postwar	  class	  of	  physicians	  had	  graduated	  from	  the	  country’s	  medical	  universities.	  Due	  to	  the	  increased	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  laboratory	  work	  and	  practical	  training,	  these	  physicians	  were	  better	  equipped	  for	  work	  both	  in	  hospitals	  and	  at	  the	  national	  health	  centers.	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  occupation,	  the	  PH&W	  initiated	  reforms	  in	  nursing	  education	  that	  occurred	  alongside	  those	  for	  medical	  schools.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  Japan’s	  qualified	  nursing	  workforce	  grew	  even	  more	  quickly	  than	  that	  of	  its	  physicians.	  Therefore,	  by	  1948	  Japan’s	  public	  health	  centers	  were	  rebuilt,	  reorganized,	  and	  staffed	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  level	  with	  medical	  professionals	  who	  were	  well-­‐trained	  in	  tuberculosis	  education,	  prevention,	  and	  care.	  	   	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  national	  health	  centers,	  sanatoria	  also	  benefitted	  from	  an	  image	  overhaul.	  	  Newspaper	  campaigns,	  like	  the	  above	  mentioned	  ones	  that	  ran	  in	  the	  national	  daily	  Yomiuri	  Shimbun	  were	  also	  used	  to	  inform	  the	  public	  about	  long-­‐
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term	  care	  options.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  health	  centers,	  these	  advertisements	  made	  the	  public	  aware	  of	  local	  sanatoria,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  places	  could	  provide	  a	  variety	  of	  services	  for	  those	  with	  the	  disease.	  With	  the	  aid	  of	  both	  public	  education	  campaigns	  and	  the	  increased	  distribution	  of	  information	  about	  tuberculosis	  by	  well-­‐trained	  nurses	  and	  physicians,	  bed-­‐occupancy	  with	  sanatoria	  swiftly	  rose.	  While	  only	  25%	  of	  sanatoria	  beds	  were	  filled	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  just	  three	  years	  later	  90%	  of	  all	  sanatoria	  beds	  were	  occupied.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  largely	  attributed	  this	  increased	  use	  of	  these	  facilities	  to	  the	  better	  trained	  staff	  and	  quality	  of	  care	  they	  offered	  as	  well	  as	  increased	  public	  awareness	  of	  tuberculosis	  as	  a	  treatable	  medical	  disease	  and	  not	  a	  hereditary	  defect.122	  As	  the	  occupation	  continued,	  sanatoria	  had	  even	  greater	  success	  in	  attracting	  patients	  who	  sought	  care.	  By	  1952	  all	  of	  Japan’s	  sanatoria,	  which	  numbered	  over	  450	  by	  the	  end	  of	  that	  year,	  were	  at	  full	  capacity.	  Most	  sanatoria	  had	  long	  waiting	  lists	  from	  which	  they	  would	  call	  their	  next	  patients.	  Furthermore,	  most	  general	  hospitals	  had	  a	  number	  of	  beds	  set	  aside	  for	  tuberculosis	  patients.	  Hospitals	  reported	  bed	  occupancies	  for	  tuberculosis	  patients	  stood	  on	  average	  at	  106%.123	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  occupation,	  sanatoria	  and	  hospitals	  could	  not	  attract	  tuberculosis	  patients	  to	  fill	  even	  half	  of	  their	  beds.	  By	  1952,	  patients	  filled	  Japan’s	  sanatoria	  and	  hospital	  wards	  to	  capacity.	  	   While	  increased	  public	  education	  about	  tuberculosis	  through	  health	  centers	  and	  the	  media	  produced	  overwhelmingly	  positive	  results	  in	  regards	  to	  encouraging	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  to	  seek	  treatment,	  it	  also	  encouraged	  opportunists	  to	  seek	  easy	  money.	  The	  spread	  of	  factual	  information	  about	  tuberculosis,	  which	  flowed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  GHQ, Public Health and Welfare in Japan: Annual Summary 1948,	  41.	  	  123	  GHQ, Public Health and Welfare in Japan: Final Summary, 1951-1952, 72-73. 	  
	   70	  
first	  from	  the	  government	  and	  medical	  community,	  through	  the	  media,	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  public,	  did	  not	  discourage	  opportunists	  from	  promoting	  tuberculosis	  cure-­‐alls.	  As	  in	  his	  1948	  novel	  No	  Longer	  Human,	  Dazai	  Osamu	  writes	  of	  pharmacies	  that	  continued	  to	  offer	  miracle	  cures	  for	  tuberculosis.	  For	  example,	  Dazai	  describes	  how	  in	  1946	  one	  pharmacy	  chain	  aggressively	  advertised	  a	  new	  tuberculosis	  medicine	  called	  “Comet.”	  This	  patent-­‐medicine	  advertised	  itself	  as	  being	  a	  compound	  of	  vitamin	  B,	  calcium,	  and	  a	  plant-­‐based	  antioxidant	  called	  Glutathione	  that	  would	  protect	  those	  who	  consumed	  it	  from	  contracting	  tuberculosis.124	  In	  truth,	  such	  miracle	  cures	  had	  little	  effect	  in	  preventing	  tuberculosis,	  but	  their	  widespread	  availability	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  cloud	  of	  misinformation	  surrounding	  tuberculosis	  had	  not	  fully	  dispersed.	  	  	   Overall,	  the	  PH&W	  section’s	  goals	  of	  encouraging	  patients	  to	  seek	  tuberculosis	  treatment	  and	  of	  staffing	  Japan’s	  sanatoria	  and	  health	  centers	  with	  qualified	  medical	  professionals	  were	  achieved	  to	  great	  success.	  The	  medical	  education	  system	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  staff	  not	  only	  national	  health	  centers	  with	  well-­‐trained	  medical	  professionals,	  but	  also	  hospitals	  and	  sanatoria.	  Health	  centers	  provided	  screenings	  and	  later	  vaccinations	  against	  tuberculosis,	  but	  they	  could	  not	  treat	  active	  cases	  of	  the	  disease.	  Patients	  with	  acute	  tuberculosis	  symptoms	  had	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  medical	  facilities	  that	  could	  admit	  patients.	  Building	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	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Yomiuri	  Shimbun,	  July	  21,	  1946,	  1.	  While,	  as	  PH&W	  documents	  point	  out,	  calcium	  and	  vitamin	  deficiencies	  do	  increase	  one’s	  risk	  for	  contracting	  tuberculosis,	  they	  are	  signs	  of	  a	  poor	  diet.	  Living	  on	  a	  poor	  diet	  for	  a	  prolonged	  amount	  of	  time	  suppresses	  the	  body’s	  immune	  system,	  making	  it	  easier	  for	  tuberculosis	  to	  become	  active.	  With	  improvements	  to	  diet,	  calcium	  and	  vitamin	  deficiencies	  disappear	  and	  the	  risk	  for	  developing	  tuberculosis	  decreases.	  Calcium	  by	  itself	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  development	  of	  tuberculosis	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  people	  who	  consumed	  large	  amounts	  of	  calcium	  based	  medicines	  by	  itself	  did	  little	  to	  prevent	  the	  development	  of	  tuberculosis.	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its	  medical	  education	  reforms	  and	  increased	  public	  awareness	  concerning	  tuberculosis,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  largely	  succeeded	  in	  carrying	  out	  the	  first	  two	  fronts	  of	  its	  attack	  against	  tuberculosis.	  	  	  
Preventing	  Tuberculosis	  in	  Japan’s	  Youth:	  
The	  School	  Lunch	  Program	  	   	  While	  fronts	  one	  and	  two	  of	  the	  PH&W	  sections	  attack	  against	  tuberculosis	  were	  aimed	  at	  both	  encouraging	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  to	  seek	  treatment	  and	  at	  providing	  better	  treatment,	  the	  third	  front	  sought	  to	  prevent	  tuberculosis	  from	  spreading	  amongst	  Japan’s	  children.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  occupation	  tuberculosis	  mortality	  rates	  were	  highest	  amongst	  those	  between	  ten	  and	  twenty-­‐years	  of	  age.	  The	  tuberculosis	  mortality	  rate	  in	  the	  year	  1943,	  which	  was	  the	  last	  year	  in	  which	  reliable	  prewar	  data	  was	  available,	  was	  230	  per	  100,000.	  This	  number,	  however,	  reflects	  the	  averaging	  of	  the	  death	  rate	  for	  those	  between	  ten	  and	  twenty-­‐four,	  and	  all	  other	  ages.	  When	  considered	  as	  their	  own	  separate	  group,	  those	  aged	  ten	  to	  twenty-­‐four	  had	  a	  mortality	  rate	  of	  320	  per	  100,000.	  Statistics	  for	  all	  other	  ages	  demonstrated	  that	  their	  mortality	  rate	  stood	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  190	  per	  100,000.125	  	  In	  order	  to	  protect	  Japan’s	  younger	  citizens	  from	  tuberculosis,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  focused	  on	  preventative	  measures.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  measures,	  the	  school	  lunch	  program,	  was	  aimed	  at	  building	  children’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  disease	  through	  improving	  nutrition.	  	  Nutrition	  had	  been	  an	  immediate	  concern	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section	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from	  the	  time	  the	  occupation	  began.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  most	  Japanese	  subsisted	  on	  small	  amounts	  of	  barley,	  potatoes,	  and	  whatever	  else	  they	  could	  scavenge	  from	  the	  countryside	  and	  the	  empty	  shelves	  of	  stores	  and	  government	  warehouses.126	  While	  some	  food	  stockpiles	  existed,	  they	  remained	  within	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  army.	  When	  the	  war	  ended,	  these	  stockpiles	  were	  not	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  people.	  Instead,	  they	  disappeared	  from	  military	  bases,	  and	  were	  funneled	  into	  the	  black	  market	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  days	  and	  weeks	  following	  Japan’s	  surrender.	  While	  this	  meant	  that	  Japan’s	  military	  stockpiles	  were	  now	  available	  on	  the	  market,	  few	  families	  could	  afford	  to	  by	  food	  from	  the	  black	  market.	  In	  the	  year	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  rates	  of	  unemployment	  were	  high	  and	  inflation	  rose	  by	  over	  500%	  within	  Japan’s	  legitimate	  economic	  market.	  Black	  market	  inflation	  rose	  even	  faster	  and	  higher.127	  From	  the	  outset,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  involved	  itself	  in	  securing	  food	  aid	  for	  Japan.	  During	  the	  initial	  months	  of	  the	  occupation,	  international	  food	  aid	  was	  hard	  to	  procure	  for	  the	  vanquished	  enemy	  population	  of	  Japan.	  Moreover,	  food	  aid	  had	  to	  be	  split	  between	  Japan	  and	  other	  countries	  like	  Germany,	  where	  the	  United	  States	  was	  also	  involved	  in	  a	  postwar	  reconstruction.	  In	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  occupation,	  food	  aid	  often	  it	  did	  not	  arrive	  at	  all.	  In	  1945-­‐1946,	  food	  aid	  provided	  by	  SCAP	  and	  distributed	  by	  the	  Japanese	  government	  was	  available	  for	  only	  six	  of	  the	  twelve	  months.128	  One	  of	  Sams’s	  first	  acts	  as	  director	  of	  the	  PH&W	  department	  was	  to	  undertake	  a	  large	  nutritional	  survey	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people.	  His	  survey,	  which	  he	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boasted	  included	  150,000	  participants,	  making	  it	  the	  largest	  scientific	  survey	  ever	  undertaken	  in	  Japan,	  concluded	  that	  the	  Japanese	  public	  subsisted	  on	  a	  diet	  heavy	  in	  carbohydrates,	  but	  was	  deficient	  in	  protein,	  vitamins,	  and	  calcium.129	  The	  PH&W	  section	  thus	  requested	  food	  aid	  for	  Japan	  that	  was	  both	  sufficient	  in	  calories	  and	  high	  in	  nutrients.	  	  The	  PH&W	  section’s	  surveys	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  greatest	  need	  for	  food	  aid	  existed	  amongst	  Japan’s	  youth.	  While	  school	  lunch	  programs	  in	  elementary	  schools	  had	  existed	  in	  Japan	  since	  the	  1880s	  and	  had	  been	  subsidized	  by	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  since	  1929,	  these	  programs	  had	  largely	  fallen	  apart	  by	  1940,	  when	  the	  ministry	  was	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  needed	  amount	  of	  food.130	  These	  lunch	  programs	  had	  been	  originally	  designed	  to	  provide	  support	  for	  Japan’s	  neediest	  families.	  Lunches	  were	  provided	  free	  of	  cost	  to	  students	  who	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  purchase	  their	  own.	  Students	  from	  financially	  stable	  families	  either	  brought	  their	  own	  lunch	  or	  paid	  a	  modest	  price	  for	  a	  school	  lunch.	  131	  In	  December	  1946,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  announced	  a	  new	  school	  lunch	  program.	  Managed	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education,	  this	  program	  provided	  food	  to	  a	  quarter	  million	  students	  living	  in	  the	  Tokyo-­‐Yokohama	  area.	  By	  1948,	  imported	  food	  aid	  had	  become	  increasingly	  available,	  and	  the	  program	  expanded	  to	  include	  over	  6,000,000	  school	  children	  from	  all	  over	  Japan.132	  The	  school	  lunch	  program	  aimed	  to	  provide	  five	  600-­‐calorie	  meals	  per	  week	  to	  children	  throughout	  Japan.	  The	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meals	  were	  designed	  to	  provide	  sufficient	  protein,	  calcium,	  and	  vitamins	  to	  overcome	  deficiencies	  that	  had	  developed	  during	  the	  war	  years.	  	  	  	   As	  Jacob	  van	  Staavern,	  an	  American	  education	  officer	  working	  for	  SCAP	  who	  oversaw	  school	  reforms	  in	  Yamanashi	  prefecture	  from	  1945-­‐1948,	  points	  out,	  the	  school	  lunch	  program	  achieved	  ends	  that	  were	  both	  “practical	  and	  humanitarian.”133	  On	  the	  practical	  side,	  he	  explains,	  the	  provision	  of	  food	  aid	  to	  children	  helped	  combat	  starvation	  and	  civil	  unrest.	  As	  a	  humanitarian	  effort,	  the	  school	  lunch	  program	  was	  also	  designed	  to	  improve	  the	  health	  and	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  country’s	  children	  and	  thereby	  prevent	  epidemics.	  Tuberculosis,	  like	  many	  other	  diseases	  endemic	  to	  Japan	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  were	  directly	  associated	  with	  malnutrition.134	  Thus,	  the	  school	  lunch	  program	  became	  both	  a	  way	  for	  the	  PH&W	  section	  and	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  to	  alleviate	  hunger	  and	  to	  prevent	  the	  further	  spread	  of	  tuberculosis.	  	  	  
Prevention	  and	  Progress:	  
Screenings,	  Vaccines,	  and	  a	  Cure	  	  	   The	  final	  two	  fronts	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section’s	  attack	  on	  tuberculosis	  exhibited	  some	  of	  the	  most	  dynamic	  changes	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Japan’s	  tuberculosis	  epidemic.	  While	  fronts	  one	  and	  two	  relied	  on	  public	  education	  to	  sweep	  the	  stigma	  away	  from	  tuberculosis,	  thus	  changing	  the	  disease	  into	  a	  medical	  issue	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	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Japanese	  public,	  the	  tuberculosis	  screening	  projects	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  occupation	  period	  made	  use	  of	  medical	  advancements	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  finally	  both	  immunize	  the	  Japanese	  public	  against	  tuberculosis	  and	  to	  cure	  active	  cases	  of	  the	  disease.	  	  	   As	  with	  other	  occupation	  period	  reforms,	  the	  tuberculosis-­‐screening	  program	  started	  small.	  School	  screenings	  took	  early	  priority	  because	  the	  ten	  to	  twenty-­‐four	  age	  group	  remained	  most	  at	  risk	  for	  developing	  tuberculosis.	  Early	  priority	  was	  also	  given	  to	  Japan’s	  industrial	  workers,	  as	  their	  working	  conditions	  o	  put	  them	  not	  only	  at	  a	  higher	  risk	  for	  contracting	  tuberculosis,	  but	  also	  made	  their	  work	  crucial	  to	  other	  aspects	  of	  Japan’s	  reconstruction.135	  	   Tuberculosis	  screening	  was	  preformed	  in	  several	  ways.	  In	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  occupation,	  when	  both	  x-­‐ray	  machines	  and	  the	  vaccine	  BCG	  (Bacillus	  
Calmette–Guérin)	  were	  in	  short	  supply,	  screenings	  consisted	  of	  checking	  a	  patient	  for	  symptoms	  that	  would	  hint	  at	  the	  presence	  of	  tuberculosis.	  Nurses	  and	  physicians	  working	  in	  health	  centers	  or	  visiting	  schools	  checked	  individuals	  for	  persistent	  coughs,	  bloody	  sputum,	  fatigue,	  and	  other	  symptoms.	  Stethoscopes	  were	  used	  to	  check	  for	  labored	  breathing.	  Patients	  suspected	  of	  having	  tuberculosis	  were	  further	  monitored	  for	  symptoms	  and	  when	  necessary	  referred	  to	  hospitals	  and	  sanatoria	  for	  treatment.136	  	   As	  more	  sophisticated	  testing	  equipment	  became	  available	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  the	  national	  health	  centers	  undertook	  more	  targeted	  screening	  and	  a	  initiated	  a	  vaccination	  program.	  	  During	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  GHQ, Public Health and Welfare in Japan: Annual Summary 1948, 40-­‐41.	  136	  GHQ, Public Health and Welfare in Japan: Annual Summary 1948, 41-­‐42.	  	  
	   76	  
occupation,	  supplies	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  sufficient	  quantities	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  screening	  and	  vaccination	  of	  all	  Japanese	  citizens.	  Therefore,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  first	  targeted	  the	  twenty	  to	  twenty-­‐four	  year-­‐old	  age	  groups,	  followed	  by	  the	  nine	  to	  fifteen	  year-­‐old	  age	  group.	  Finally,	  in	  1948,	  testing	  was	  expanded	  to	  include	  infants.	  137	  	   In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  occupation,	  tuberculosis	  vaccinations	  comprised	  a	  two-­‐step	  process.	  A	  potential	  vaccine	  recipient	  was	  first	  tested	  with	  a	  tuberculin	  injection.	  By	  injecting	  the	  recipient	  with	  tuberculin,	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  tell	  if	  the	  patient	  was	  a	  tuberculosis	  carrier.	  While	  the	  patient	  may	  not	  have	  been	  visibly	  sick,	  tuberculosis	  has	  the	  ability	  lay	  dormant	  in	  an	  otherwise	  healthy	  person.	  For	  this	  reason,	  preventative	  measures	  such	  as	  improving	  one’s	  diet	  and	  receiving	  adequate	  sleep	  are	  important	  means	  of	  preventing	  the	  development	  and	  potential	  spread	  of	  the	  disease.	  Failing	  to	  do	  so,	  can	  result	  in	  an	  active	  case	  of	  tuberculosis.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  BCG	  vaccination	  also	  can	  cause	  patients	  who	  are	  already	  tuberculosis	  carriers	  to	  become	  active	  cases.	  Like	  most	  vaccines,	  BCG	  was	  developed	  from	  a	  weakened	  strain	  of	  tuberculosis.	  This	  strain	  is	  injected	  into	  the	  body	  in	  serum	  form.	  As	  the	  tuberculosis	  bacterium	  contained	  within	  the	  vaccine	  attacks	  the	  body’s	  cells,	  the	  body’s	  immune	  system	  builds	  a	  resistance	  to	  the	  disease.	  When	  injected	  into	  healthy	  bodies,	  the	  BCG	  vaccine	  produces	  a	  	  immunity	  to	  tuberculosis.	  When	  BCG	  was	  injected	  into	  patients	  with	  latent	  tuberculosis	  however,	  the	  vaccine	  could	  potentially	  cause	  the	  patient	  to	  develop	  an	  active	  case	  of	  tuberculosis.138	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  Sams,	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  “BCG	  Fact	  Sheet”	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Preventionhttp://www.cdc.gov/tb/	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For	  this	  reason,	  BCG	  could	  not	  be	  used	  indiscriminately	  on	  Japan’s	  population.	  Patients	  would	  first	  receive	  tuberculin	  testing	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  had	  prior	  exposure	  to	  tuberculosis.	  If	  the	  patient	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  positive	  for	  tuberculosis,	  a	  fact	  which	  could	  be	  determined	  by	  checking	  the	  tuberculin	  injection	  site	  for	  a	  skin	  reaction,	  the	  BCG	  vaccine	  could	  not	  be	  administered.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  health	  centers’	  early	  screening	  campaigns	  showed	  that	  nearly	  50%	  of	  Japanese	  under	  the	  age	  of	  thirty	  tested	  positive	  for	  tuberculosis,	  and	  could	  not	  be	  immunized.139	  Despite	  this,	  the	  early	  vaccination	  campaigns	  did	  achieve	  considerable	  success	  in	  both	  preventing	  tuberculosis	  and	  halting	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  disease.	  When	  compared	  with	  their	  1945	  levels,	  tuberculosis	  morbidity	  rates	  had	  dropped	  by	  79%	  by	  1948.	  Moreover,	  the	  mortality	  rate	  dropped	  from	  280	  deaths	  per	  100,000	  population	  members	  in	  1945	  to	  181	  per	  100,000	  in	  1948.140	  In	  1947,	  Japanese	  laboratories	  developed	  a	  method	  for	  mass	  producing	  freeze-­‐dried	  BCG.	  Unlike	  the	  wet	  vaccine,	  which	  boasted	  only	  a	  seven-­‐day	  potency	  period,	  the	  dry	  form	  of	  the	  vaccine	  could	  be	  easily	  transported	  and	  did	  not	  quickly	  expire.141	  With	  a	  steady	  and	  sufficient	  supply	  of	  BCG	  readily	  available	  thanks	  to	  the	  work	  of	  these	  Japanese	  medical	  researchers,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  mandated	  tuberculin	  testing	  and	  BCG	  immunization	  in	  all	  cases	  possible	  to	  begin	  by	  no	  later	  than	  July	  1,	  1949.142	  By	  1949,	  Japan	  had	  both	  sufficient	  means	  to	  screen	  for	  tuberculosis,	  and	  to	  immunize	  its	  population.	  Sanatoria	  had	  been	  restored	  and	  were	  well	  equipped	  to	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deal	  with	  active	  cases	  of	  the	  disease,	  and	  health	  centers	  provided	  accessible	  and	  accurate	  information	  about	  the	  disease.	  All	  that	  was	  missing	  was	  a	  cure	  for	  tuberculosis.	  Japan	  and	  the	  world	  had	  first	  hung	  their	  hopes	  for	  a	  tuberculosis	  cure	  on	  tuberculin	  and	  then	  on	  BCG.	  While	  these	  drugs	  proved	  to	  be	  effective	  tools	  in	  identifying	  and	  immunizing	  against	  tuberculosis,	  neither	  provided	  a	  means	  for	  curing	  the	  disease.	  However,	  in	  1948	  	  Japan	  the	  PH&W	  section	  introduced	  a	  cure	  for	  the	  tenacious	  disease.	  Streptomycin,	  an	  antibiotic	  drug	  first	  isolated	  in	  a	  laboratory	  at	  Rutgers	  University	  in	  1943,	  was	  a	  drug	  the	  proved	  its	  worth	  in	  the	  United	  State’s	  military	  hospitals	  during	  World	  War	  II	  as	  a	  cure	  for	  various	  kinds	  of	  infections.	  	  By	  1947,	  researchers	  showed	  streptomycin	  to	  also	  be	  an	  effective	  drug	  for	  treating	  patients	  with	  active	  cases	  of	  tuberculosis.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  received	  their	  first	  shipment	  of	  streptomycin	  in	  1948.143	  The	  introduction	  of	  streptomycin	  into	  Japan	  represented	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  several	  ways.	  Most	  obviously,	  tuberculosis	  became	  a	  curable	  disease.	  Streptomycin	  arrived	  in	  sanatoria,	  where	  it	  was	  used	  to	  treat	  the	  most	  serious	  of	  tuberculosis	  cases.	  The	  introduction	  of	  streptomycin	  also	  provided	  relief	  to	  Japanese	  citizens	  that	  had	  tested	  positive	  for	  tuberculosis	  and	  therefore	  could	  not	  be	  protected	  with	  BCG	  vaccinations.	  Finally,	  the	  introduction	  of	  streptomycin	  aided	  in	  dispelling	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis	  once	  and	  for	  all.	  With	  a	  cure	  available,	  sufferers	  were	  not	  left	  worrying	  that	  their	  disease	  was	  incurable.	  In	  addition,	  the	  fact	  that	  tuberculosis	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had	  a	  medical	  cure	  reemphasized	  that	  tuberculosis	  represented	  a	  medical	  issue,	  not	  a	  	  hereditary	  condition.	  	  	  
Tuberculosis	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Occupation	  	  By	  the	  time	  the	  occupation	  ended	  in	  1952,	  tuberculosis	  control	  in	  Japan	  had	  been	  largely	  achieved.	  Mortality	  rates	  dropped	  from	  their	  all-­‐time	  high	  of	  280	  per	  100,000	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  occupation	  to	  112	  per	  100,000	  in	  1952.	  The	  PH&W	  sections	  five-­‐front	  attack	  on	  tuberculosis	  filled	  sanatoria	  with	  patients	  no	  longer	  afraid	  to	  seek	  treatments.	  In	  fact,	  the	  demand	  for	  tuberculosis	  treatment	  was	  so	  great	  that	  most	  public	  hospitals	  had	  their	  own	  overflowing	  tuberculosis	  wards	  as	  well.	  School	  lunch	  programs	  provided	  Japan’s	  children	  with	  the	  nutritious	  food	  they	  needed	  both	  to	  ward	  off	  tuberculosis	  and	  grow	  healthily.	  Finally,	  national	  health	  centers	  remained	  frontlines	  for	  tuberculosis	  prevention	  through	  their	  provision	  of	  information,	  screenings,	  and	  vaccinations.	  While	  1952	  heralded	  the	  end	  of	  the	  occupation,	  it	  did	  not	  mark	  the	  end	  of	  the	  MHW’s	  battle	  against	  tuberculosis.	  The	  departure	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section	  allowed	  the	  MHW	  section	  to	  step	  into	  the	  spotlight,	  and	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  it	  had	  been	  denied	  in	  tuberculosis	  control	  during	  the	  occupation	  period.	  In	  the	  year	  immediately	  following	  the	  occupation’s	  closure,	  the	  MHW	  provided	  and	  additional	  10,000	  beds	  within	  Japan’s	  hospitals	  and	  sanatoria	  for	  tuberculosis	  sufferers.	  It	  also	  provided	  government	  subsidies	  that	  paid	  for	  50%	  of	  any	  surgeries	  or	  streptomycin	  courses	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that	  patients	  needed.144	  The	  tuberculosis	  control	  program	  	  remained	  what	  the	  MHW	  considered	  “the	  most	  important	  part	  of	  health	  administration	  in	  Japan,”	  but	  through	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  the	  MHW,	  and	  countless	  Japanese	  medical	  professors,	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  had	  finally	  been	  brought	  under	  control.	  145	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CHAPTER	  5	  
CONCLUSION	  	  While	  efforts	  to	  control	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  in	  Japan	  began	  long	  before	  the	  Allied	  Occupation	  did,	  the	  period	  from	  1945-­‐1952	  brought	  together	  new	  medical	  techniques	  and	  old	  health	  practices	  in	  order	  to	  finally	  achieve	  control	  over	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  The	  occupation	  period	  represented	  a	  time	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Japanese	  government	  and	  the	  Allied	  forces	  not	  only	  to	  establish	  Japan	  as	  a	  democracy,	  but	  also	  to	  change	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people	  in	  fundamental	  ways.	  Many	  of	  these	  changes	  targeted	  the	  health	  of	  Japanese	  citizens,	  and	  as	  such,	  affected	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly.	  Whether	  either	  side	  realized	  it,	  cooperation	  was	  instrumental	  in	  controlling	  tuberculosis	  and	  other	  diseases	  endemic	  to	  Japan	  at	  the	  close	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  War.	  While	  both	  the	  Public	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (PH&W)	  section	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  for	  the	  Allied	  Powers	  (SCAP)	  and	  the	  Japanese	  government’s	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  (MHW)	  might	  have	  eventually	  overcome	  tuberculosis	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  other,	  neither	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  do	  so	  as	  quickly	  as	  they	  did	  when	  working	  together	  their	  cooperation	  ensured	  that	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic	  was	  brought	  under	  control	  quickly,	  and	  that	  many	  lives	  were	  saved.	  	  The	  Japanese	  government	  and	  medical	  community	  struggled	  for	  decades	  to	  overcome	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis.	  Doing	  so	  alone	  during	  the	  Occupation	  would	  have	  cost	  both	  time	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  many	  Japanese	  citizens.	  During	  the	  SCAP	  aggressively	  pursued	  tuberculosis	  control.	  While	  it	  was	  aided	  by	  the	  newest	  medical	  discoveries,	  without	  the	  Japanese	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government’s	  cooperation	  and	  manpower,	  their	  programs	  could	  not	  have	  been	  as	  widespread	  and	  effective	  as	  they	  were.	  	   A	  reading	  of	  PH&W	  documents	  suggests	  that	  General	  Crawford	  F.	  Sams	  and	  his	  department	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  cooperation	  to	  occupation	  period	  disease	  control.	  The	  PH&W	  documents	  emphasize	  the	  section’s	  role	  in	  planning	  disease	  control	  projects,	  in	  reorganizing	  what	  the	  section	  saw	  as	  highly	  dysfunctional	  Japanese	  institutions,	  and	  in	  introducing	  “modern	  science”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  drugs	  and	  techniques.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  PH&W	  section	  did	  formulate	  plans	  and	  mandate	  changes,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  also	  overlooked	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  their	  plans	  and	  changes	  strongly	  resembled	  prewar	  practices	  that	  were	  already	  familiar	  to	  Japan.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Historians	  Christopher	  Aldous	  and	  Akihita	  Suzuki	  are	  correct	  in	  pointing	  out	  that	  much	  of	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  PH&W	  section	  resembled	  prewar	  practices,	  and	  that	  this	  resemblance	  had	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  PH&W	  sections	  success	  during	  the	  occupation	  period.146	  	   It	  is	  also	  true,	  however,	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  and	  the	  changes	  they	  instituted	  in	  regards	  to	  tuberculosis	  control	  were	  crucial	  to	  the	  swift	  overcoming	  of	  the	  disease.	  While	  the	  prewar	  Japanese	  Home	  Ministry	  and	  Japan’s	  medical	  community	  attempted	  to	  dispel	  the	  social	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  their	  attempts	  to	  do	  so	  were	  unsuccessful	  as	  they	  relied	  heavily	  on	  new	  regulations	  that	  Japan’s	  medical	  community	  was	  disinclined	  to	  follow.	  The	  PH&W	  section’s	  response	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  social	  stigma	  relied	  on	  both	  legislature	  and	  public	  education.	  While	  neither	  of	  these	  approaches	  were	  unheard	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Aldous	  and	  Suzuki,	  Reforming	  Public	  Health	  in	  Occupied	  Japan,	  3.	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in	  Japan,	  the	  PH&W	  section	  took	  a	  stronger	  stance	  in	  regards	  to	  mandated	  tuberculosis	  reporting	  and	  committed	  more	  resources	  to	  public	  education	  campaigns.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  also	  brought	  considerable	  resources	  to	  the	  fight	  against	  tuberculosis	  in	  the	  form	  of	  monetary	  support,	  experts	  in	  fields	  including	  hospital	  administration	  and	  statics,	  and	  new	  medications	  like	  streptomycin.	  While	  all	  of	  these	  resources	  could	  have	  been	  eventually	  acquired	  without	  the	  help	  of	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  their	  acquisition	  would	  likely	  have	  taken	  a	  backseat	  to	  Japan’s	  political	  and	  economic	  recovery	  and	  it’s	  urban	  reconstruction	  projects.	  	  	   Cooperation,	  of	  course,	  requires	  the	  combined	  efforts	  of	  two	  or	  more	  parties.	  The	  PH&W	  section’s	  role	  in	  restoring	  health	  to	  Japan	  is	  well	  documented	  both	  in	  their	  own	  papers	  and	  in	  the	  English-­‐language	  research	  on	  the	  occupation	  period.	  Conversely,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Japan’s	  MHW,	  medical	  professionals,	  and	  even	  the	  narratives	  of	  Japan’	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  themselves	  tended	  to	  go	  unnoticed.	  William	  Johnston’s	  The	  Modern	  Epidemic	  examines	  the	  relationship	  between	  Japan’s	  government	  officials	  and	  medical	  community	  and	  the	  disease	  tuberculosis,	  however	  Japanese	  participants	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  tuberculosis	  during	  the	  occupation	  period	  remain	  largely	  invisible.	  While	  in	  his	  memoir	  Sams	  depicts	  his	  decisions	  and	  actions	  in	  detail	  so	  clear	  that	  it	  borders	  on	  the	  dubious,	  he	  never	  bothers	  to	  name	  the	  very	  people	  who	  provided	  the	  information	  and	  legwork	  upon	  which	  his	  orders	  rely.	  	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  the	  PH&W’s	  documents	  as	  a	  whole.	  While	  the	  PH&W	  section’s	  yearly	  reports	  introduce	  plans	  to	  fight	  disease	  and	  proudly	  record	  where	  progress	  has	  been	  made,	  they	  reports	  fail	  to	  recognize	  that	  majority	  of	  the	  work	  on	  the	  ground	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  MHW,	  Japanese	  sanitation	  workers,	  and	  Japan’s	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medical	  experts.	  While	  in	  some	  cases	  these	  enactors	  of	  disease	  control	  benefited	  from	  training	  provided	  by	  the	  PH&W	  section,	  the	  actual	  task	  of	  controlling	  tuberculosis	  was	  transferred	  to	  their	  hands	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  PH&W	  authorities	  certainly	  visited	  hospitals	  and	  sanatoria	  where	  tuberculosis	  sufferers	  were	  treated,	  but	  Japanese	  physicians,	  nurses,	  and	  medical	  aides	  provided	  the	  majority	  of	  actual	  tuberculosis	  treatment.	  Memos	  outlining	  SCAP	  directives	  show	  that	  the	  responsibility	  for	  manufacturing	  vaccines	  like	  BCG	  and	  medical	  supplies	  including	  X-­‐ray	  film	  was	  turned	  over	  to	  the	  Japanese	  government	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  PH&W	  section	  determined	  a	  turnover	  was	  possible.	  Japanese	  workers	  were	  also	  responsible	  for	  carrying	  out	  projects	  like	  the	  school	  lunch	  program,	  which	  remained	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  foreign	  aid	  for	  years.	  Without	  Japanese	  cooperation	  and	  manpower,	  the	  plans	  laid	  by	  the	  PH&W	  section	  could	  never	  have	  come	  to	  fruition.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  future	  research	  into	  the	  history	  of	  tuberculosis	  during	  the	  occupation	  period	  is	  needed.	  While	  this	  paper	  has	  attempted	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  successful	  management	  of	  tuberculosis	  during	  the	  occupation	  was	  born	  out	  of	  the	  cooperation	  between	  the	  PH&W	  section	  and	  their	  Japanese	  counterparts,	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  role	  that	  the	  Japanese	  people	  played	  in	  the	  process	  remain	  open	  for	  future	  historians	  to	  explore.	  While	  the	  PH&W	  and	  the	  MHW	  funded	  the	  occupation	  period	  public	  education	  campaigns	  that	  helped	  dispel	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  tuberculosis,	  the	  advertisements	  and	  literature	  used	  for	  such	  purposes	  were	  largely	  the	  work	  of	  Japanese	  citizens	  within	  both	  the	  media	  and	  the	  medical	  community.	  Similarly,	  postwar	  sanatoria	  were	  filled	  with	  physicians	  and	  patients	  who	  related	  to	  tuberculosis	  differently	  than	  their	  prewar	  successors.	  Inquiry	  into	  either	  of	  these	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subjects	  would	  unearth	  new	  voices	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  tuberculosis	  and	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  how	  attitudes	  towards	  tuberculosis	  changed	  during	  the	  occupation	  period.	  In	  Japan	  today	  tuberculosis	  lives	  on	  in	  the	  public’s	  imaginations	  rather	  than	  within	  their	  bodies.	  Along	  with	  classic	  works	  such	  as	  Tanizaki	  Junichirō’s	  The	  
Makioka	  Sisters	  (Sasameyuki),	  Dazai	  Osamu’s	  No	  Longer	  Human	  remains	  a	  popular	  fictional	  depiction	  of	  one	  man’s	  battle	  with	  tuberculosis.	  Japanese	  consumers	  can	  experience	  Ōba’s	  tribulations	  not	  only	  by	  reading	  the	  original	  novel,	  but	  through	  the	  mediums	  of	  film	  and	  manga	  as	  well.	  More	  recently,	  Miyazaki	  Hayao’s	  final	  film,	  The	  
Wind	  Also	  Rises,	  features	  tuberculosis	  prominently,	  demonstrating	  that	  even	  today	  tuberculosis	  remains	  a	  part	  of	  Japan’s	  historical	  identity.	  Such	  works	  ensure	  that	  future	  generations	  remember	  the	  struggles	  of	  the	  past.	  	  It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  the	  successes	  of	  the	  past	  are	  remembered	  as	  well,	  for	  the	  history	  of	  tuberculosis	  during	  the	  occupation	  period	  is	  ultimately	  one	  of	  these	  successes.	  More	  importantly,	  it	  is	  a	  shared	  success.	  The	  PH&W	  section	  acted	  quickly	  to	  control	  a	  situation	  that	  jeopardized	  many	  lives.	  Their	  actions	  were	  at	  times	  authoritarian,	  and	  their	  reflections	  on	  the	  work	  the	  had	  done	  often	  overlooked	  the	  role	  that	  Japanese	  actors	  played	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  tuberculosis,	  but	  resources	  and	  expertise	  the	  PH&W	  section	  offered	  saved	  countless	  lives.	  So,	  too,	  did	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Japanese	  MHW,	  medical	  professionals,	  and	  others	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  many	  programs	  aimed	  at	  controlling	  the	  tuberculosis	  epidemic.	  They	  formed	  the	  foundation	  of	  every	  strike	  made	  against	  the	  disease,	  and	  without	  their	  work,	  the	  PH&W	  sections	  plans	  would	  never	  have	  come	  to	  fruition.	  The	  fight	  against	  tuberculosis	  in	  Japan	  was	  won	  through	  the	  efforts	  and	  cooperation	  of	  both	  the	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occupier	  and	  the	  occupied.	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  represented	  every	  bit	  as	  grand	  a	  triumph	  of	  the	  occupation	  period	  as	  the	  democratization	  of	  Japan	  did.	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